Rfc4793
TitleThe EAP Protected One-Time Password Protocol (EAP-POTP)
AuthorM. Nystroem
DateFebruary 2007
Format:TXT, HTML
Status:INFORMATIONAL






Network Working Group                                        M. Nystroem
Request for Comments: 4793                                  RSA Security
Category: Informational                                    February 2007


        The EAP Protected One-Time Password Protocol (EAP-POTP)

Status of This Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   This document describes a general Extensible Authentication Protocol
   (EAP) method suitable for use with One-Time Password (OTP) tokens,
   and offers particular advantages for tokens with direct electronic
   interfaces to their associated clients.  The method can be used to
   provide unilateral or mutual authentication, and key material, in
   protocols utilizing EAP, such as PPP, IEEE 802.1X, and Internet Key
   Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2).

























RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................4
      1.1. Scope ......................................................4
      1.2. Background .................................................4
      1.3. Rationale behind the Design ................................4
      1.4. Relationship with EAP Methods in RFC 3748 ..................5
   2. Conventions Used in This Document ...............................5
   3. Authentication Model ............................................5
   4. Description of the EAP-POTP Method ..............................6
      4.1. Overview ...................................................6
      4.2. Version Negotiation ........................................9
      4.3. Cryptographic Algorithm Negotiation .......................10
      4.4. Session Resumption ........................................11
      4.5. Key Derivation and Session Identifiers ....................13
      4.6. Error Handling and Result Indications .....................13
      4.7. Use of the EAP Notification Method ........................14
      4.8. Protection against Brute-Force Attacks ....................14
      4.9. MAC Calculations in EAP-POTP ..............................16
           4.9.1. Introduction .......................................16
           4.9.2. MAC Calculation ....................................16
           4.9.3. Message Hash Algorithm .............................16
           4.9.4. Design Rationale ...................................17
           4.9.5. Implementation Considerations ......................17
      4.10. EAP-POTP Packet Format ...................................17
      4.11. EAP-POTP TLV Objects .....................................20
           4.11.1. Version TLV .......................................20
           4.11.2. Server-Info TLV ...................................21
           4.11.3. OTP TLV ...........................................23
           4.11.4. NAK TLV ...........................................33
           4.11.5. New PIN TLV .......................................35
           4.11.6. Confirm TLV .......................................38
           4.11.7. Vendor-Specific TLV ...............................41
           4.11.8. Resume TLV ........................................43
           4.11.9. User Identifier TLV ...............................46
           4.11.10. Token Key Identifier TLV .........................47
           4.11.11. Time Stamp TLV ...................................48
           4.11.12. Counter TLV ......................................49
           4.11.13. Challenge TLV ....................................50
           4.11.14. Keep-Alive TLV ...................................51
           4.11.15. Protected TLV ....................................52
           4.11.16. Crypto Algorithm TLV .............................54
   5. EAP Key Management Framework Considerations ....................57
   6. Security Considerations ........................................57
      6.1. Security Claims ...........................................57
      6.2. Passive and Active Attacks ................................58
      6.3. Denial-of-Service Attacks .................................59
      6.4. The Use of Pepper .........................................59



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


      6.5. The Race Attack ...........................................60
   7. IANA Considerations ............................................60
      7.1. General ...................................................60
      7.2. Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier Octets .................61
   8. Intellectual Property Considerations ...........................61
   9. Acknowledgments ................................................61
   10. References ....................................................62
      10.1. Normative References .....................................62
      10.2. Informative References ...................................62
   Appendix A. Profile of EAP-POTP for RSA SecurID ...................64
   Appendix B. Examples of EAP-POTP Exchanges ........................65
      B.1. Basic Mode, Unilateral Authentication .....................65
      B.2. Basic Mode, Session Resumption ............................66
      B.3. Mutual Authentication without Session Resumption ..........67
      B.4. Mutual Authentication with Transfer of Pepper .............69
      B.5. Failed Mutual Authentication ..............................70
      B.6. Session Resumption ........................................71
      B.7. Failed Session Resumption .................................73
      B.8. Mutual Authentication, and New PIN Requested ..............75
      B.9. Use of Next OTP Mode ......................................78
   Appendix C. Use of the MPPE-Send/Receive-Key RADIUS Attributes ....80
      C.1. Introduction ..............................................80
      C.2. MPPE Key Attribute Population .............................80
   Appendix D. Key Strength Considerations ...........................80
      D.1. Introduction ..............................................80
      D.2. Example 1: 6-Digit One-Time Passwords .....................81
      D.3. Example 2: 8-Digit One-Time Passwords .....................81
























RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


1.  Introduction

1.1.  Scope

   This document describes an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
   [1] method suitable for use with One-Time Password (OTP) tokens, and
   offers particular advantages for tokens that are electronically
   connected to a user's computer, e.g., through a USB interface.  The
   method can be used to provide unilateral or mutual authentication,
   and key material, in protocols utilizing EAP, such as PPP [10], IEEE
   802.1X [11], and IKEv2 [12].

1.2.  Background

   A One-Time Password (OTP) token may be a handheld hardware device, a
   hardware device connected to a personal computer through an
   electronic interface such as USB, or a software module resident on a
   personal computer, which generates one-time passwords that may be
   used to authenticate a user towards some service.  This document
   describes an EAP method intended to meet the needs of organizations
   wishing to use OTP tokens in an interoperable manner to authenticate
   users over EAP.  The method is designed to be independent of
   particular OTP algorithms and to meet the requirements on modern EAP
   methods (see [13]).

   The basic variant of this method provides client authentication only.
   This mode is only to be used within a secured tunnel.  A more
   advanced variant provides mutual authentication, integrity protection
   of the exchange, protection against eavesdroppers, and establishment
   of authenticated keying material.  Both variants allow for fast
   session resumption.

   While this document also includes a profile of the general method for
   the RSA SecurID(TM) mechanism, it is described in terms of general
   constructions.  It is therefore intended that the document will also
   serve as a framework for use with other OTP algorithms.

   Note: The term "OTP" as used herein shall not be confused with the
   EAP OTP method defined in [1].

1.3.  Rationale behind the Design

   EAP-POTP has been designed with the intent that its messages and data
   elements be easily parsed by EAP implementations.  This makes it
   easier to programmatically use the EAP method in the peer and the
   authenticator, reducing the need for user interactions and allowing
   for local generation of user prompts, when needed.  In contrast, the
   Generic Token Card (GTC) method from [1], which uses text strings



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   generated by the EAP server, is intended to be interpreted and acted
   upon by humans.  Furthermore, EAP-POTP allows for mutual
   authentication and establishment of keying material, which GTC does
   not.  To retain the generic nature of GTC, the EAP-POTP method has
   been designed to support a wide range of OTP algorithms, with
   profiling expected for specific such algorithms.  This document
   provides a profile of EAP-POTP for RSA SecurID tokens.

1.4.  Relationship with EAP Methods in RFC 3748

   The EAP OTP method defined in [1], which builds on [14], is an
   example of a particular OTP algorithm and is not related to the EAP
   method defined in this document, other than that a profile of EAP-
   POTP may be created for the OTP algorithm from [14].

   The Generic Token Card EAP method defined in [1] is intended to work
   with a variety of OTP algorithms.  The same is true for EAP-POTP, the
   EAP method defined herein.  Advantages of profiling a particular OTP
   algorithm for use with EAP-POTP, compared to using EAP GTC, are
   described in Section 1.3.

2.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
   "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", and "MAY", in this document are to be
   interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [2].

3.  Authentication Model

   The EAP-POTP method provides user authentication as defined below.
   Additionally, it may provide mutual authentication (authenticating
   the EAP server to the EAP client) and establish keying material.

   There are basically three entities in the authentication method
   described here:

   o  A client, or "peer", using EAP terminology, acting on behalf of a
      user possessing an OTP token;

   o  A server, or "authenticator", using EAP terminology, to which the
      user needs to authenticate; and

   o  A backend authentication server, providing an authentication
      service to the authenticator.

   The term "EAP server" is used here with the same meaning as in [1].
   Any protocol used between the authenticator and the backend
   authentication server is outside the scope of this document, although



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   RADIUS [15] is a typical choice.  It is assumed that the EAP client
   and the peer are located on the same host, and hence only the term
   "peer" is used in the following for these entities.

   The EAP-POTP method assumes the use of a shared secret key, or
   "seed", which is known both by the user and the backend
   authentication server.  The secret seed is stored on an OTP token
   that the user possesses, as well as on the authentication server.

   In its most basic variant, the EAP-POTP method provides only one
   Service (namely, user authentication) where the user provides
   information to the authentication server so that the server can
   authenticate the user.  A more advanced variant provides mutual
   authentication, protection against eavesdropping, and establishment
   of authenticated keying material.

4.  Description of the EAP-POTP Method

4.1.  Overview

   Note: Since the EAP-POTP method is general in nature, the term
   "POTP-X" is used below as a placeholder for an EAP method type
   identifier, identifying the use of a particular OTP algorithm with
   EAP-POTP.  As an example, in the case of using RSA SecurID tokens
   within EAP-POTP, the EAP method type shall be 32 (see Appendix A).

   A typical EAP-POTP authentication is performed as follows (Appendix B
   provides more detailed examples):

   a.  The optional EAP Identity Request/Response is exchanged, as per
       RFC 3748 [1].  An identity provided here may alleviate the need
       for a "User Identifier" or a "Token Key Identifier" triplet
       (TLV), defined below, later in the exchange.

   b.  The EAP server sends an EAP-Request of type POTP-X with a Version
       TLV.  The Version TLV indicates the highest and lowest version of
       this method supported by the server.  The EAP server typically
       also includes an OTP TLV in the EAP-Request.  The OTP TLV
       instructs the peer to respond with the current OTP (possibly in
       protected form), and may contain a challenge and some other
       information, like server policies.  The EAP server should also
       include a Server-Info TLV in the request, and must do so if it
       supports session resumption.  The Server-Info TLV identifies the
       authentication server, contains an identifier for this (new)
       session, and may be used by the peer to find an already existing
       session with the EAP server.





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   c.  The peer responds with an EAP-Response of type Nak (3) if it does
       not support POTP-X or if it does not support a version of this
       method that is also supported by the server, as indicated in the
       server's Version TLV.

       If the peer supports a version of this method that is also
       supported by the EAP server, the peer generates an EAP-Response
       of type POTP-X as follows:

       *  First, it generates a Version TLV, which indicates the peer's
          highest supported version within the range of versions offered
          by the server.  This Version TLV will be part of the EAP-
          Response to the EAP server.

       *  Next, if the peer's highest supported version equals that of
          the EAP server, and the EAP server sent a Server-Info TLV, the
          peer checks if it has a saved session with the EAP server.  If
          an existing session with the server is found, and session
          resumption is possible (the Server-Info TLV may explicitly
          disallow it), the peer calculates new session keys (if the
          session is a protected-mode session) and responds with a
          Resume TLV and the Version TLV.

       *  Otherwise, if the peer's highest supported version equals that
          of the EAP server, and the received EAP-Request message
          contains an OTP TLV, the peer requests (possibly through user
          interaction) the OTP token to calculate a one-time password
          based on the information in the received EAP-Request message
          (which could, for example, carry a challenge), the current
          token state (e.g., token time), a shared secret (the "seed"),
          and a user-provided PIN (note that, depending on the OTP token
          type, some of the information in the EAP-Request may not be
          used in the OTP calculation, and the PIN may be optional too).
          If the received OTP TLV has the P bit set (see below), the
          peer then combines the token-provided OTP with other
          information, and provides the combined data to a key
          derivation function.  The key derivation function generates
          several keys, of which one is used to calculate a Message
          Authentication Code (MAC) on the received message, together
          with some other information.  The resulting MAC, together with
          some additional information, is then placed in an OTP TLV
          (with the P bit set) that is sent in a response to the EAP
          server, together with the Version TLV.  If the P bit is not
          set in the received OTP TLV, the peer instead inserts the
          calculated OTP value directly in an OTP TLV, which then is
          sent to the EAP server together with the Version TLV.





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


       *  Finally, if the peer's highest supported version differs from
          the server's, or if the server did not provide any TLVs
          besides the Version TLV in its initial request, the peer just
          sends back the generated Version TLV as an EAP-Response to the
          EAP server.

   d.  If the EAP server receives an EAP-Response of type Nak (3), the
       session negotiation failed and the EAP server may try with
       another EAP method.  Otherwise, the EAP server checks the peer's
       supported version.  If the peer did not support the highest
       version supported by the server, the server will send a new EAP-
       Request with TLVs adjusted for that version.  Otherwise, assuming
       the EAP server did send additional TLVs in its initial EAP-
       Request, the EAP server will attempt to authenticate the peer
       based on the response provided in c).  Depending on the result of
       this authentication, the EAP server may do one of the following:

       *  send a new EAP-Request of type POTP-X to the peer indicating
          that session resumption was not possible, and ask for a new
          OTP (this would be the case when the peer responded with a
          Resume TLV, and the session indicated in the Resume TLV was
          not valid),

       *  send a new EAP-Request of type POTP-X to the peer (e.g., to
          ask for the next OTP),

       *  accept the authentication (and send an EAP-Request message
          containing a Confirm TLV to the peer if the received response
          has the P bit set or was a successful attempt at a protected-
          mode session resumption; otherwise, send an EAP-Success
          message to the peer), or

       *  fail the authentication (and send an EAP-Failure message --
          possibly preceded by an EAP-Request message of type
          Notification (2) -- to the peer).

   e.  If the peer receives an EAP-Success or an EAP-Failure message the
       protocol run is finished.  If the peer receives an EAP-Request of
       type Notification, it responds as specified by RFC 3748 [1].  If
       the peer receives an EAP-Request of type POTP-X with a Confirm
       TLV, it attempts to authenticate the EAP server using the
       provided data.  If the authentication is successful, the peer
       responds with an EAP-Response of type POTP-X with a Confirm TLV.
       If it is unsuccessful, the peer responds with an empty EAP-
       Response of type POTP-X.  If the peer receives an EAP-Request of
       type POTP-X containing some other TLVs, it continues as specified
       in c) above (though no version negotiation will take place in
       this case) or as described for those TLVs.



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   f.  When an EAP server, which has sent an EAP-Request of type POTP-X
       with a Confirm TLV, receives an EAP-Response of type POTP-X with
       a Confirm TLV present, it can proceed in one of two ways: If it
       has detected that there is a need to send additional EAP-Requests
       of type POTP-X, it shall enter a "protected state", where, from
       then on, all POTP-X TLVs must be encrypted and integrity-
       protected before being sent (at this point, the parties shall
       have calculated a master session key as described in Section
       4.5).  One reason to continue the POTP-X conversation after
       exchange of the Confirm TLV could be that the user needs to
       update her OTP PIN; hence, the EAP server needs to send a New PIN
       TLV.  At that point, the handshake is back at step c) above
       (except for the version negotiation and the protection of all
       TLVs).  If there is no need to send additional EAP-Request
       packets, the EAP server shall instead send an EAP-Success method
       to the peer to indicate successful protocol completion.  The EAP
       server may not continue the conversation unless it indicates its
       intent to do so in the Confirm TLV.

       An EAP server, which has sent an EAP-Request of type POTP-X with
       a Confirm TLV and receives an EAP-Response of type POTP-X, which
       is empty (i.e., does not contain any TLVs), shall respond with an
       EAP-Failure and terminate the handshake.

   As implied by the description, steps c) through f) may be carried out
   a number of times before completion of the exchange.  One example of
   this is when the authentication server initially requests an OTP,
   accepts the response from the peer, performs an (intermediary)
   Confirm TLV exchange, requests the peer to select a new PIN, and
   finally asks the peer to authenticate with an OTP based on the new
   PIN (which again will be followed with a final Confirm TLV exchange).

4.2.  Version Negotiation

   The EAP-POTP method provides a version negotiation mechanism that
   enables implementations to be backward compatible with previous
   versions of the protocol.  This specification documents the EAP-POTP
   protocol version 1.  Version negotiation proceeds as follows:

   a.  In the first EAP-Request of type POTP-X, the EAP server MUST send
       a Version TLV in which it sets the "Highest" field to its highest
       supported version number, and the "Lowest" field to its lowest
       supported version number.  The EAP server MAY include other TLV
       triplets, as described below, that are compatible with the
       "Highest" supported version number to optimize the number of
       round-trips in the case of a peer supporting the server's
       "Highest" version number.




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   b.  If the peer supports a version of the protocol that falls within
       the range of versions indicated by the EAP server, it MUST
       respond with an EAP-Response of type POTP-X that contains a
       Version TLV with the "Highest" field set to the highest version
       supported by the peer.  The peer MUST also respond to any TLV
       triplets included in the EAP-Request, if it supported the
       "Highest" supported version indicated in the server's Version
       TLV.

       The EAP peer MUST respond with an EAP-Response of type Nak (3) if
       it does not support a version that falls within the range of
       versions indicated by the EAP server.  This will allow the EAP
       server to use another EAP method for peer authentication.

   c.  When the EAP server receives an EAP-Response containing a Version
       TLV from the peer, but the "Highest" supported version field in
       the TLV differs from the "Highest" supported version field sent
       by the EAP server, or when the version is the same as the one
       originally proposed by the EAP server, but the EAP server did not
       include any TLV triplets in the initial request, the EAP server
       sends a new EAP-Request of type POTP-X with the negotiated
       version and TLV triplets as desired and described herein.

   The version negotiation procedure guarantees that the EAP peer and
   server will agree to the highest version supported by both parties.
   If version negotiation fails, use of EAP-POTP will not be possible,
   and another mutually acceptable EAP method will need to be negotiated
   if authentication is to proceed.

   The EAP-POTP version field may be modified in transit by an attacker.
   It is therefore important that EAP entities only accept EAP-POTP
   versions according to an explicit policy.

4.3.  Cryptographic Algorithm Negotiation

   Cryptographic algorithms are negotiated through the use of the Crypto
   Algorithm TLV.  EAP-POTP provides a default digest algorithm
   (SHA-256) [3], a default encryption algorithm (AES-CBC) [4] , and a
   default MAC algorithm (HMAC) [5], and these algorithms MUST be
   supported by all EAP-POTP implementations.  An EAP server that does
   not want to make use of any other algorithms than the default ones
   need not send a Crypto Algorithm TLV.  An EAP server that does want
   to negotiate use of some other algorithms MUST send the Crypto
   Algorithm TLV in the initial EAP-Request of type POTP-X that also
   contains an OTP TLV with the P bit set.  The TLV MUST NOT be present
   in any other EAP-Request in the session. (The two exceptions to this
   are 1) if the client attempted a session resumption that failed and
   therefore did not evaluate a sent Crypto Algorithm TLV, or 2) if the



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Crypto Algorithm TLV was part of the initial message from the EAP
   server, and the client negotiated another EAP-POTP version than the
   highest one supported by the EAP server.  When either of these cases
   apply, the server MUST include the Crypto Algorithm TLV in the first
   EAP-Request that also contains an OTP TLV with the P bit set
   subsequent to the failed session resumption / protocol version
   negotiation.)  In the Crypto Algorithm TLV, the EAP server suggests
   some combination of digest, encryption, and MAC algorithms. (If the
   server only wants to negotiate a particular class of algorithms, then
   suggestions for the other classes need not be present, since the
   default applies.)

   The peer MUST include a Crypto Algorithm TLV in an EAP-Response if
   and only if an EAP-Request of type POTP-X has been received
   containing a Crypto Algorithm TLV, it was legal for that EAP-Request
   to contain a Crypto Algorithm TLV, the peer does not try to resume an
   existing session, and the peer and the EAP server agree on at least
   one algorithm not being the default one.  If the peer does not supply
   a value for a particular class of algorithms in a responding Crypto
   Algorithm TLV, then the default algorithm applies for that class.
   When resuming an existing session (see the next section), there is no
   need for the peer to negotiate since the session already is
   associated with a set of algorithms.  Servers MUST fail a session
   (i.e., send an EAP-Failure) if they receive an EAP-Response TLV
   containing both a Resume TLV and a Crypto Algorithm TLV.

   Clearly, EAP servers and peers MUST NOT suggest any other algorithms
   than the ones their policy allows them to use.  Policies may also
   restrict what combinations of cryptographic algorithms are
   acceptable.

4.4.  Session Resumption

   This method makes use of session identifiers and server identifiers
   to allow for improved efficiency in the case where a peer repeatedly
   attempts to authenticate to an EAP server within a short period of
   time.  This capability is particularly useful for support of wireless
   roaming.

   In order to help the peer find a session associated with the EAP
   server, an EAP server that supports session resumption MUST send a
   Server-Info TLV containing a server identifier in its initial EAP-
   Request of type POTP-X that also contains an OTP TLV.  The identifier
   may then be used by the peer for lookup purposes.

   It is left to the peer whether or not to attempt to continue a
   previous session, thus shortening the negotiation.  Typically, the
   peer's decision will be made based on the time elapsed since the



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   previous authentication attempt to that EAP server.  If the peer
   decides to attempt to resume a session with the EAP server, it sends
   a Resume TLV identifying the chosen session and other contents, as
   described below, to the EAP server.

   Based on the session identifier chosen by the peer, and the time
   elapsed since the previous authentication, the EAP server will decide
   whether to allow the session resumption, or continue with a new
   session.

   o  If the EAP server is willing to resume a previously established
      session, it MUST authenticate the peer based on the contents of
      the Resume TLV.  If the authentication succeeds, the handshake
      will continue in one of two ways:

      *  If the session is a protected-mode session, then the server
         MUST respond with a request containing a Confirm TLV.  If the
         Confirm TLV authenticates the EAP server, then the peer
         responds with an empty Confirm TLV, to which the EAP server
         responds with an EAP-Success message.  If the Confirm TLV does
         not authenticate the EAP server, the peer responds with an
         empty EAP-Response of type POTP-X.

      *  If the session is not a protected-mode session, i.e., it is a
         session created from a basic-mode peer authentication, then the
         server MUST respond with an EAP-Success message.

      If the authentication of the peer fails, the EAP server SHOULD
      send another EAP-Request containing an OTP TLV and a Server-Info
      TLV with the N bit set to indicate that no session resumption is
      possible.  The EAP server MAY also send an EAP-Failure message,
      possibly preceded by an EAP-Request of type Notification (2), in
      which case, the EAP run will terminate.

   o  If the EAP server is not willing or able to resume a previously
      established session, it will respond with another EAP-Request
      containing an OTP TLV and a Server-Info TLV with the N bit set
      (indicating no session resumption).

   Sessions SHOULD NOT be maintained longer than the security of the
   exchange which created the session permits.  For example, if it is
   estimated that an attacker could be successful in brute-force
   searching for the OTP in 24 hours, then EAP-POTP session lifetimes
   should be clearly less than this value.







RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


4.5.  Key Derivation and Session Identifiers

   The EAP-POTP method described herein makes use of a key derivation
   function denoted "PBKDF2".  PBKDF2 is described in [6], Section 5.2.
   The PBKDF2 PRF SHALL be set to the negotiated MAC algorithm.  The
   default MAC algorithm, which MUST be supported, is HMAC-SHA256.  HMAC
   is defined in [5], and SHA-256 is defined in [3].  HMAC-SHA256 is the
   HMAC construct from [5] with SHA-256 as the hash function H.  The
   output length of HMAC-SHA256, when used as a PRF for PBKDF2, shall be
   32 octets (i.e., the full output length).

   The output from PBKDF2 as described here will consist of five keys
   (see Section 4.11.3 for details on how to calculate these keys):

   o  K_MAC, a MAC key used for mutual authentication and integrity
      protection,

   o  K_ENC, an encryption key used to protect certain data during the
      authentication,

   o  SRK, a session resumption key only used for session resumption
      purposes,

   o  MSK, a Master Session Key, as defined in [1], and

   o  EMSK, an Extended Master Session Key, also as defined in [1].

      For the default algorithms, K_MAC, K_ENC, and SRK SHALL be 16
      octets.  For other cases, the key lengths will be as determined by
      the negotiated algorithms.  The MSK and the EMSK SHALL each be 64
      octets, in conformance with [1].  Therefore, in the case of
      default algorithms, the "dkLen" parameter from Section 5.2 of [6]
      SHALL be set to 176 (the combined length of K_MAC, K_ENC, SRK,
      MSK, and EMSK).

   [1] and [16] define usage of the MSK and the EMSK .  For a particular
   use case, see also Appendix C.

4.6.  Error Handling and Result Indications

   EAP does not allow for the sending of an EAP-Response of type Nak (3)
   within a method after the initial EAP-Request and EAP-Response pair
   of that particular method has been exchanged (see [1], Section 2.1).
   Instead, when a peer is unable to continue an EAP-POTP session, the
   peer MAY respond to an outstanding EAP-Request by sending an empty
   EAP-Response of type POTP-X rather than immediately terminating the
   conversation.  This allows the EAP server to log the cause of the
   error.



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   To ensure that the EAP server receives the empty EAP-Response, the
   peer SHOULD wait for the EAP server to reply before terminating the
   conversation.  The EAP server MUST reply with an EAP-Failure.

   When EAP-POTP is run in protected mode, the exchange of the Confirm
   TLV (Section 4.11.6) serves as a success result indication; when the
   peer receives a Confirm TLV, it knows that the EAP server has
   successfully authenticated it.  Similarly, when the EAP server
   receives the Confirm TLV response from the peer, it knows that the
   peer has authenticated it.  In protected mode, the peer will not
   accept an EAP-Success packet unless it has received and validated a
   Confirm TLV.  The Confirm TLV sent from the EAP server to the peer is
   a "protected result indication" as defined in [1], as it is integrity
   protected and cannot be replayed.  The Confirm TLV sent from the peer
   to the EAP server is, however, not a protected result indication.  An
   empty EAP-POTP response sent from the peer to the EAP server serves
   as a failure result indication.

4.7.  Use of the EAP Notification Method

   Except where explicitly allowed in the following, the EAP
   Notification method MUST NOT be used within an EAP-POTP session.  The
   EAP Notification method MAY be used within an EAP-POTP session in the
   following situations:

   o  The EAP server MAY send an EAP-Request of type Notification (2)
      when it has received an EAP-Response containing an OTP TLV and is
      unable to authenticate the user.  In this case, once the EAP-
      Response of type Notification is received, the EAP server MAY
      retry the authentication and send a new EAP-Request containing an
      OTP TLV, or it MAY fail the session and send an EAP-Failure
      message.

   o  The EAP server MAY send an EAP-Request of type Notification (2)
      when it has received an unacceptable New PIN TLV.  In this case,
      once the EAP-Response of type Notification is received, the EAP
      server MAY retry the PIN update and send a new EAP-Request with a
      New PIN TLV, or it MAY fail the session and send an EAP-Failure
      message.

4.8.  Protection against Brute-Force Attacks

   Since OTPs may be relatively short, it is important to slow down an
   attacker sufficiently so that it is economically unattractive to
   brute-force search for an OTP, given an observed EAP-POTP handshake
   in protected mode.  One way to do this is to do a high number of
   iterated hashes in the PBKDF2 function.  Another is for the client to
   include a value ("pepper") unknown to the attacker in the hash



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   computation.  Whereas a traditional "salt" value normally is sent in
   the clear, this "pepper" value will not be sent in the clear, but may
   instead be transferred to the EAP server in encrypted form.  In
   practice, the procedure is as follows:

   a.  The EAP server indicates in its OTP TLV whether it supports
       pepper searching.  Additionally, it may indicate to the peer that
       a new pepper shall be chosen.

   b.  If the peer supports the use of pepper, the peer checks whether
       it already has established a shared pepper with this server:

       If it does have a pepper stored for this server, and the server
       did not indicate that a new pepper shall be generated, then it
       uses the existing pepper value, as specified in Section 4.11.3
       below, to calculate an OTP TLV response.  In this case, the
       iteration count shall be kept to a minimum, as the security of
       the scheme is provided through the pepper, and efficiency
       otherwise is lost.

       If the peer does not have a pepper stored for this server, but
       the server indicated support for pepper searching, or the server
       indicated that a new pepper shall be generated, then the peer
       generates a random and uniformly distributed pepper of sufficient
       length (the maximum length supported by the server is provided in
       the server's OTP TLV), and includes the new pepper in the PBKDF2
       computation.

       If the peer does not have a pepper stored for this server, and
       the server did not indicate support for pepper searching, then a
       pepper will not be used in the response computation.

       Clearly, if the peer itself does not support the use of pepper,
       then a pepper will not be used in the response computation.

   c.  The EAP server may, in its subsequent Confirm TLV, provide a
       pepper to the peer for later use.  In this case, the pepper will
       be substantially longer than a peer-chosen pepper, and encrypted
       with a key derived from the PBKDF2 computation.

   The above procedure allows for pepper updates to be initiated by
   either side, e.g., based on policy.  Since the pepper can be seen as
   a MAC key, its lifetime should be limited.

   An EAP server that is not capable of storing pepper values for each
   user it is authenticating may still support the use of pepper; the
   cost for this will be the extra computation time to do pepper
   searches.  This cost is still substantially lower than the cost for



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   an attacker, however, since the server already knows the underlying
   OTP.

4.9.  MAC Calculations in EAP-POTP

4.9.1.  Introduction

   In protected mode, EAP-POTP uses MACs for authentication purposes, as
   well as to ensure the integrity of protocol sessions.  This section
   defines how the MACs are calculated and the rationale for the design.

4.9.2.  MAC Calculation

   In protected mode, and when resuming a previous session, rather than
   sending authenticating credentials (such as one-time passwords or
   shared keys) directly, evidence of knowledge of the credentials is
   sent.  This evidence is a MAC on the hash of (certain parts of) EAP-
   POTP messages exchanged so far in a session using a key K_MAC:

   mac = MAC(K_MAC, msg_hash(msg_1, msg_2, ..., msg_n))

   where

   "MAC" is the negotiated MAC algorithm, "K_MAC" is a key derived as
   specified in Section 4.5, and "msg_hash(msg_1, msg_2, ..., msg_n)" is
   the message hash defined below of messages msg_1, msg_2, ..., msg_n.

4.9.3.  Message Hash Algorithm

   To compute a message hash for the MAC, given a sequence of EAP
   messages msg_1, msg_2, ..., msg_n, the following operations shall be
   carried out:

   a.  Re-transmitted messages are removed from the sequence of
       messages.

       Note: The resulting sequence of messages must be an alternating
       sequence of EAP Request and EAP Response messages.

   b.  The contents (i.e., starting with the EAP "Type" field and
       excluding the EAP "Code", "Identifier", and "Length" fields) of
       each message, msg_1, msg_2, ..., msg_n, is concatenated together.

   c.  User identifier TLVs MUST NOT be included in the hash (this is to
       allow for a backend service that does not know about individual
       user names), i.e., any such TLV is removed from the message in
       which it appeared.




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   d.  The resulting string is hashed using the negotiated hash
       algorithm.

4.9.4.  Design Rationale

   The reason for excluding the "Identifier" field is that the actual,
   transmitted "Identifier" field is not always known to the EAP method
   layer.  The reason for excluding the "Length" field is to allow the
   possibility for an intermediary to remove or replace a Username TLV
   (e.g., for anonymity or service reasons) before passing a received
   response on to an authentication server.  While this on the surface
   may appear as bad security practice, it may in practice only result
   in denial of service, something which always may be achieved by an
   attacker able to modify messages in transit.  By excluding the "Code"
   field, the hash is simply calculated on applicable sent and received
   message contents.  Excluding the "Code" field is regarded as harmless
   since the hash is to be made on the sequence of POTP-X messages, all
   having alternating (known) Code values, namely 1 (Request) and 2
   (Response).

4.9.5.  Implementation Considerations

   To save on storage space, each EAP entity may partially hash messages
   as they are sent and received (e.g., HashInit(); HashUpdate(message
   1); ...; HashUpdate(message n-1); HashFinal(message n)).  This
   reduces the amount of state needed for this purpose to the internal
   state required for the negotiated hash algorithm.

4.10.  EAP-POTP Packet Format

   A summary of the EAP-POTP packet format is shown below.  The fields
   are transmitted from left to right.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Code      |   Identifier  |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |   Reserved    | TLV-based EAP-POTP message ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Code

      1 - Request

      2 - Response





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Identifier

      The Identifier field is 1 octet and aids in matching responses
      with requests.  For a more detailed description of this field and
      how to use it, see [1].

   Length

      The Length field is 2 octets and indicates the length of the EAP
      packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, Version,
      Flags, and TLV-based EAP-POTP message fields.

   Type

      Identifies use of a particular OTP algorithm with EAP-POTP.

   Reserved

      This octet is reserved for future use.  It SHALL be set to zero
      for this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this octet for this
      version of EAP-POTP.

   TLV-based EAP-POTP message

   This field will contain 0, 1, or more Type-Length-Value triplets
   defined as follows (this is similar to the EAP-TLV TLVs defined in
   PEAPv2 [17], and the explanation of the generic fields is borrowed
   from that document).

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                              Value ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      0 - Non-mandatory TLV

      1 - Mandatory TLV

      The TLVs within EAP POTP-X are used to carry parameters between
      the EAP peer and the EAP server.  An EAP peer may not necessarily
      implement all the TLVs supported by an EAP server, and to allow
      for interoperability, a special TLV allows an EAP server to
      discover if a TLV is supported by the EAP peer.



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


      The mandatory bit in a TLV indicates that if the peer or server
      does not support the TLV, it MUST send a NAK TLV in response; all
      other TLVs in the message MUST be ignored.  If an EAP peer or
      server finds an unsupported TLV that is marked as non-mandatory
      (i.e., optional), it MUST NOT send a NAK TLV on this ground only.

      The mandatory bit does not imply that the peer or server is
      required to understand the contents of the TLV.  The appropriate
      response to a supported TLV with content that is not understood is
      defined by the specification of the particular TLV.

   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of the EAP-POTP.

   TLV Type

      The following TLV types are defined for use with EAP-POTP:

       0 - Reserved for future use
       1 - Version
       2 - Server-Info
       3 - OTP
       4 - NAK
       5 - New PIN
       6 - Confirm
       7 - Vendor-Specific
       8 - Resume
       9 - User Identifier
      10 - Token Key Identifier
      11 - Time Stamp
      12 - Counter
      13 - Keep-Alive
      14 - Protected
      15 - Crypto Algorithm
      16 - Challenge

      These TLVs are defined in the following.  With the exception of
      the NAK TLV, a particular TLV type MUST NOT appear more than once
      in a message of type POTP-X.

   Length

      The length of the Value field in octets.





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Value

      The value of the TLV.

4.11.  EAP-POTP TLV Objects

4.11.1.  Version TLV

   The Version TLV carries information about the supported EAP-POTP
   method version.

   This TLV MUST be present in the initial EAP-Request of type POTP-X
   from the EAP server and in the initial response of type POTP-X from
   the peer.  It MUST NOT be present in any subsequent EAP-Request or
   EAP-Response in the session.  The Version TLV MUST be supported by
   all peers, and all EAP servers conforming to this specification and
   MUST NOT be responded to with a NAK TLV.  The version negotiation
   procedure is described in detail in Section 4.2.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Reserved    |    Highest    |    Lowest     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      1 - Mandatory TLV

   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   TLV Type

      1

   Length

      3 in EAP-Requests, 2 in EAP-Responses







RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Reserved

      Reserved for future use.  This octet MUST be set to zero for this
      version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this octet for this version of
      EAP-POTP.

   Highest

      This field contains an unsigned integer representing the highest
      protocol version supported by the sender.  If a value provided by
      a peer to an EAP server falls between the server's "Highest" and
      "Lowest" supported version (inclusive), then that value will be
      the negotiated version for the authentication session.

   Lowest

      This field contains an unsigned integer representing the lowest
      version acceptable by the EAP server.  The field MUST be present
      in an EAP-Request.  The field MUST NOT be present in an EAP-
      Response.  A peer SHALL respond to an EAP-Request of type POTP-X
      with an EAP-Response of type Nak (3) if the peer's highest
      supported version is lower than the value of this field.

   This document defines version 1 of the protocol.  Therefore, EAP
   server implementations conforming to this document SHALL set the
   "Highest" field to 1.  Peer implementations conforming to this
   document SHALL set the "Highest" field to 1.

4.11.2.  Server-Info TLV

   The Server-Info TLV carries information about the EAP server and the
   session (when applicable).  It provides one piece in the framework
   for fast session resumption.

   This TLV SHOULD always be present in an EAP-Request of type POTP-X
   that also carries an OTP TLV, as long as the peer has not been
   authenticated, and MUST be present in such a request if the server
   supports session resumption.  It MUST NOT be present in any other
   EAP-Request of type POTP-X or in any EAP-Response packets.  This TLV
   type MUST be supported by all peers conforming to this specification
   and MUST NOT be responded to with a NAK TLV (this is not to say that
   all peers need to support session resumption, only that they cannot
   respond to this TLV with a NAK TLV).








RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Reserved  |N|            Session Identifier                 |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                Session Identifier (continued)                 |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Sess.Id (cont.)|             Nonce ... (16 octets)
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                       Server Identifier ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      1 - Mandatory TLV

   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   TLV Type

      2

   Length

      25 + length of Server Identifier field

   Reserved

      Reserved for future use.  All 7 bits MUST be set to zero for this
      version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version of
      EAP-POTP.

   N

      The N bit signals that the peer MUST NOT attempt to resume any
      session it has stored associated with this server.









RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Session Identifier

      An 8-octet identifier for the session about to be negotiated.
      Note that, in the case of session resumption, this session
      identifier will not be used (the session identifier for the
      resumed session will continue to be used).

   Nonce

      A 16-octet nonce chosen by the server.  During session resumption,
      this nonce is used when calculating new K_ENC, K_MAC, SRK, MSK,
      and EMSK keys as specified below.

   Server Identifier

      An identifier for the authentication server.  The peer MAY use
      this identifier to search for a stored session associated with
      this server, or to associate the session to be negotiated with the
      server.  The value of the identifier SHOULD be chosen so as to
      reduce the risk of collisions with other EAP server identifiers as
      much as possible.  One possibility is to use the DNS name of the
      EAP server.  The identifier MAY also be used by the peer to select
      a suitable key on the OTP token (when there are multiple keys
      available).

      The identifier MUST NOT be longer than 128 octets.  The identifier
      SHALL be a UTF-8 [7] encoded string of printable characters
      (without any terminating NULL character).

4.11.3.  OTP TLV

   In an EAP-Request, the OTP TLV is used to request an OTP (or a value
   derived from an OTP) from the peer.  In an EAP-Response, the OTP TLV
   carries an OTP or a value derived from an OTP.

   This TLV type MUST be supported by all peers and all EAP servers
   conforming to this specification and MUST NOT be responded to with a
   NAK TLV.  The OTP TLV MUST NOT be present in an EAP-Request of type
   POTP-X that contains a New PIN TLV.  Further, the OTP TLV MUST NOT be
   present in an EAP-Response of type POTP-X unless the preceding EAP-
   Request of type POTP-X contained an OTP TLV and it was valid for it
   to do so.  Finally, an OTP TLV MUST NOT be present in an EAP-
   Response of type POTP-X that also contains a Resume TLV.  The OTP TLV
   is defined as follows:







RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Reserved    |A|P|C|N|T|E|S| Pepper Length |Iteration Count|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Iteration Count (cont.)            |  Auth. Data   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                 Authentication Data (cont.) ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      1 - Mandatory TLV

   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   TLV Type

      3

   Length

      7 + length of Authentication Data field

   Reserved

      Reserved for future use.  All 9 bits SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore these bits for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   A

      The A bit MUST be set in an EAP-Request if and only if the request
      immediately follows an EAP-Response of type POTP-X containing a
      New PIN TLV (see Section 4.11.5), and the new PIN in the response
      was accepted by the EAP server.  In this case, the A bit signals
      that the EAP-server has accepted the PIN, and that the peer SHALL
      use the newly established PIN when calculating the response (when
      applicable).  The A bit MUST NOT be set if the S bit is set.  If a
      request has both the S bit and the A bit set, the peer SHALL
      regard the request as invalid, and return an empty POTP-X EAP-
      Response message.



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


      In an EAP-Response, the A bit, when set, indicates that the OTP
      was calculated with the use of the newly selected user PIN.  The A
      bit MUST be set in a response if and only if the EAP-Request which
      triggered the response contained an OTP TLV with the A bit set.

   P

      In an EAP-Request, the P bit indicates that the OTP in the
      response MUST be protected.  Use of this bit also indicates that
      mutual authentication will take place, as well as generation of
      keying material.  It is RECOMMENDED to always set the P bit.  If a
      peer receives an EAP-Request with an OTP TLV that does not have
      the P bit set, and the peer's policy dictates protected mode, the
      peer MUST respond with an empty POTP-X EAP-Response message.  All
      peers MUST support protected mode.

      In an EAP-Response, this bit indicates that the provided OTP has
      been protected (see below).  The P bit MUST be set in a response
      (and hence the OTP MUST be protected) if and only if the EAP-
      Request that triggered the response contained an OTP TLV with the
      P bit set.

      In an 802.1x EAP over LAN (EAPOL) environment (this includes
      wireless LAN environments), the P bit MUST be set, or,
      alternatively, the EAP-POTP method MUST be carried out inside an
      authenticated tunnel that provides a cryptographic binding with
      inner EAP methods such as the one provided by PEAPv2 [17].

   C

      The C bit carries meaning only when the OTP algorithm in question
      makes use of server challenges.  For other OTP algorithms, the C
      bit SHALL always be set to zero.

      In an EAP-Request, the C bit ("Combine") indicates that the OTP
      SHALL be calculated using both the provided challenge and internal
      state (e.g., current token time).  The OTP SHALL be calculated
      based only on the provided challenge (and the shared secret) if
      the C bit is not set, and a challenge is present.  The returned
      OTP SHALL always be calculated based on the peer's current state
      (and the shared secret) if no challenge is present.  If the C bit
      is set but no challenge is provided, the peer SHALL regard the
      request as invalid, and return an empty POTP-X EAP-Response
      message.







RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


      In an EAP response, this bit indicates that the provided OTP has
      been calculated using a provided challenge and the token state.
      The C bit MUST be set in a response if and only if the EAP-Request
      that triggered the response contained an OTP TLV with the C bit
      set and a challenge.

   N

      In an EAP-Request, the N bit, when set, indicates that the OTP to
      calculate SHALL be based on the next token "state", and not the
      current one.  As an example, for a time-based token, this means
      the next time slot.  For an event-based token, this could mean the
      next counter value, if counter values are used.  This bit will
      normally not be set in initial EAP-Request messages, but may be
      set in subsequent ones.  Further, the N bit carries no meaning in
      an EAP-Request if a challenge is present and the C bit is not set,
      and SHALL be set to 0, in this case.  If a request that has the N
      bit set also contains a challenge, but does not have the C bit
      set, the peer SHALL regard the request as invalid, and return an
      empty POTP-X EAP-Response message.  Note that setting the N bit in
      an EAP-Request will normally advance the internal state of the
      token.

      In an EAP-Response, the N bit, when set, indicates that the OTP
      was calculated based on the next token "state" (as explained
      above), and not the current one.  The N bit MUST be set in a
      response if and only if the EAP-Request that triggered the
      response contained an OTP TLV with the N bit set.

   T

      The T bit only carries meaning for OTP methods normally
      incorporating a user PIN in the OTP computation.

      In an EAP-Request, the T bit, when set, indicates that the OTP to
      calculate MUST NOT include a user PIN.

      In an EAP-Response, the T bit, when set, indicates that the OTP
      was calculated without the use of a user PIN.  The T bit MUST be
      set in a response if and only if the EAP-Request that triggered
      the response contained an OTP TLV with the T bit set.  Note that
      client policy may prohibit PIN-less calculations; in these cases,
      the client MAY respond with an empty POTP-X EAP response message.








RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   E

      In an EAP-Request, the E bit, when set, indicates that the peer
      MUST NOT use any stored pepper value associated with this server
      in the PBKDF2 computation.  Rather, it MUST generate a new pepper
      (if supported by the peer) and/or use the iteration count
      parameter to protect the OTP (if the server's Max Pepper Length is
      0, then the peer MUST rely on the iteration count only to protect
      the OTP).  This bit will usually not be set in initial EAP-Request
      messages, but may be set in subsequent ones, e.g., if the server,
      upon receipt of an OTP TLV with a pepper identifier, detects that
      it does not have a pepper with that identifier in storage.  This
      bit carries no meaning, and MUST be set to zero, when the P bit is
      not set.  If a request has the E bit set but not the P bit, a peer
      SHALL regard the request as invalid, and return an empty POTP-X
      EAP-Response message.

      In an EAP-Response, the E bit indicates that the response has been
      calculated without use of any stored pepper value.

   S

      In an EAP-Request, the S bit ("Same"), when set, indicates that
      the peer SHOULD calculate its response based on the same OTP value
      as was used for the preceding response.  This bit MAY be set when
      the EAP server has received an OTP TLV from the peer protected
      with a pepper, of which the server is no longer in possession.
      Since the server has not attempted validation of the provided
      data, there is no need for the EAP peer to retrieve a new OTP
      value.  This bit carries no meaning, and MUST be set to zero, when
      the E bit is not set.  A peer SHALL regard a request where the S
      bit is set, but not the E bit, as invalid, and return an empty
      POTP-X EAP-Response message.  Further, the S bit MUST NOT be set
      when the A bit also is set; see above.

      In an EAP-Response, the S bit is never set.

   Pepper Length

      This octet SHALL be present if and only if the P bit is set.  When
      present, it contains an unsigned integer, having a value between 0
      and 255 (inclusive).  In an EAP-Request, the integer represents
      the maximum length (in bits) of a client-generated pepper the
      server is prepared to search for.  Peers MUST NOT generate peppers
      longer than this value.  If the value is set to zero, it means the
      peer MUST NOT generate a pepper for the PBKDF2 calculation.  In an
      EAP-Response, it indicates the length of the used pepper.




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Iteration Count

      These 4 octets SHALL be present if and only if the P bit is set.
      When present, they contain an unsigned, 4-octet integer in network
      byte order.  In an EAP-Request, the integer represents the maximum
      iteration count the peer may use in the PBKDF2 computation.  Peers
      MUST NOT use iteration counts higher than this value.  In an EAP-
      Response, it indicates the actual iteration count used.

   Note regarding the Pepper Length and Iteration Count parameters: A
   peer MUST compare these policy parameters provided by the EAP server
   with local policy and MUST NOT continue the handshake if use of the
   EAP server's suggested parameters would result in a lower security
   than the client's acceptable policy.  If the security given by the
   EAP server's provided policy parameters surpasses the security level
   given by the peer's local policy, the client SHOULD use the server's
   parameters (subject to reason - active attackers could otherwise
   mount simple denial-of-service attacks against peers or servers,
   e.g., by providing unreasonably high values for the iteration count).
   Note that the server-provided parameters only apply to the case where
   the peer cannot use or does not have a previously provided server-
   provided pepper.  If a peer cannot continue the handshake due to the
   server's policy being unacceptable, it MUST return an empty POTP-X
   EAP-Response message.

   Authentication Data

   EAP-Request:  In an EAP-Request, the Authentication Data field, when
      present, contains an optional "challenge".  The challenge is an
      octet string that SHOULD be uniquely generated for each request in
      which it is present (i.e., it is a "nonce"), and SHOULD be 8
      octets or longer.  To avoid fragmentation (i.e., EAP messages
      longer than the minimum EAP MTU size; see [1]), the challenge MUST
      NOT be longer than 64 octets.  When the challenge is not present,
      the OTP will be calculated on the current token state only.  The
      peer MAY ignore a provided challenge if and only if the OTP token
      the peer is interacting with is not capable of including a
      challenge in the OTP calculation.  In this case, EAP server
      policies will determine whether or not to accept a provided OTP
      value.

   EAP-Response: The following applies to the Authentication Data field
      in an EAP-Response:

      *  When the P bit is not set, the peer SHALL directly place the
         OTP value calculated by the token in the Authentication Data
         field.  In this case, the EAP server MUST NOT send a Confirm




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


         TLV upon successful authentication of the peer (instead, it
         sends an EAP-Success message).

      *  When the P bit is set, the peer SHALL populate this field as
         follows.  After the token has calculated the OTP value, the
         peer SHALL compute:

            K_MAC | K_ENC | MSK | EMSK | SRK = PBKDF2(otp, salt | pepper
            | auth_id, iteration_count, key_length)

            where

            "|" denotes concatenation,

            "otp" is the already computed OTP value,

            "salt" is a 16-octet nonce,

            "pepper" is an optional nonce (at most, 255 bits long, and,
            if necessary, padded to be a multiple of 8 bits long; see
            below) included to complicate the task of finding a matching
            "otp" value for an attacker,

            "auth_id" is an identifier (at most, 255 octets in length)
            for the authenticator (i.e., the network access server) as
            reported by lower layers and as specified below,

            "iteration_count" is an iteration count chosen such that the
            computation time on the peer is acceptable (based on the
            server's indicated policy and the peer's local policy),
            while an attacker, having observed the response and
            initiating a search for a matching OTP, will be sufficiently
            slowed down.  The "iteration_count" value MUST be chosen to
            provide a suitable level of protection (e.g., at least
            100,000) unless a server-provided pepper is being used, in
            which case, it SHOULD be 1.

            "key_length" is the combined length of the desired key
            material, in octets.  When the default algorithms are used,
            key_length is 176.

            The "pepper" values are only included in PBKDF2 calculations
            and are never sent to EAP servers (though the peers do send
            their length, in bits).  The purpose of the pepper values
            are, as mentioned above, to slow down an attacker's search
            for a matching OTP, while not slowing down the peer (which
            iterated hashes do).  If the pepper has been generated by
            the peer, and the chosen pepper length in bits is not a



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


            multiple of 8, then the pepper value SHALL be padded to the
            left, with '0' bits to the nearest multiple of 8 before
            being used in the PBKDF2 calculation.  This is to ensure the
            input to the calculation consists only of whole octets.  As
            an example, if the chosen pepper length is 4, the pepper
            value will be padded to the left, with 4 '0' bits to form an
            octet before being used in the PBKDF2 calculation.

            When pepper is used, it is RECOMMENDED that the length of
            the pepper and the iteration count are chosen in such a way
            that it is computationally infeasible/unattractive for an
            attacker to brute-force search for the given OTP within the
            lifetime of that OTP.

            As mentioned previously, a peer MUST NOT include a newly
            generated pepper value in the PBKDF2 computation if the
            server did not indicate its support for pepper searching in
            this session.  If the server did not indicate support for
            pepper searching, then the PBKDF2 computation MUST be
            carried out with a sufficiently higher number of iterations
            so as to compensate for the lack of pepper (see further
            Appendix D).

            A server may, in an earlier session, have transferred a
            pepper value to the peer in a Confirm TLV (see below).  When
            this is the case, and the peer still has that pepper value
            stored for this server, the peer MUST NOT generate a new
            pepper but MUST, instead, use this transferred pepper value
            in the PBKDF2 calculations.  The only exception to this is
            when a local policy (e.g., timer) dictates that the peer
            must switch to a new pepper (and the server indicated
            support for pepper searching).

            The following applies to the auth_id component:

            -  For dial-up, "auth_id" SHALL be either the empty string
               or the phone number called by the peer.  The phone number
               SHALL be specified in the form of a URL conformant with
               RFC 3966 [8], e.g., "tel:+16175550101".  Processing of
               received phone numbers SHALL be conformant with RFC 3966
               (this assumes that "tel" URIs will be shorter than 256
               octets, which would normally be the case).

            -  For use with IEEE 802.1X, "auth_id" SHALL be either the
               empty string or the MAC address of the authenticator in
               canonical binary format (6 octets).





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


            -  For IP-based EAP, "auth_id" SHALL be either the empty
               string or the IPv4 or IPv6 address of the authenticator
               as seen by the peer and in binary format (4 or 16 octets,
               respectively).  As an example, the IPv4 address
               "192.0.2.5" would be represented as (in hex) C0 00 02 05,
               whereas the IPv6 address "2001:DB8::101" would be
               represented as (in hex) 20 01 0D B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
               00 00 00 01 01.

            Note: Use of the authenticator's identifying information
            within the computation aids in protection against man-in-
            the-middle attacks, where a rogue authenticator seeks to
            intercept and forward the Authentication Data in order to
            impersonate the peer at a legitimate authenticator (but see
            also the discussion around spoofed authenticator addresses
            in Section 6).  For these reasons, a peer SHOULD NOT set the
            auth_id component to the empty string unless it is unable to
            learn the identifying information of the authenticator.  In
            these cases, the EAP server's policy will determine whether
            or not the session may continue.

            As an example, when otp = "12345678", salt =
            0x54434534543445435465768789099880, pepper is not used,
            auth_id = "192.0.2.5", iteration_count = 2000 (decimal), and
            key_length = 176 (decimal), the input to the PBKDF2
            calculation will be (first two parameters in hex, line wrap
            for readability):

            (3132333435363738, 54434534543445435465768789099880 |
            c0000205, 2000, 176)

            As described, when the default algorithms are used, K_MAC is
            the first 16 octets of the output from PBKDF2, K_ENC the
            next 16 octets, MSK the following 64 octets, EMSK the next
            64 octets, and SRK the final 16 octets.  Using K_MAC, the
            peer calculates:

            mac = MAC(K_MAC, msg_hash(msg_1, msg_2, ..., msg_n))

            as specified in Section 4.9 and where msg_1, msg_2, ...,
            msg_n is a sequence of all EAP messages of type POTP-X
            exchanged so far in this session, as sent and received by
            the peer (for the peer's initial MAC, it will typically be
            just one message: the EAP server's initial EAP-Request of
            type POTP-X).






RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


            The peer then places the first 16 octets of "mac" in the
            Authentication Data field, followed by the "salt" value,
            followed by one octet representing the length of the
            "auth_id" value in octets, followed by the actual "auth_id"
            value in binary form, and optionally followed by a pepper
            identifier (only when the peer made use of a pepper value
            previously provided by the EAP server).  Pepper identifiers,
            when present, are always 4 octets.  All variables SHALL be
            present in the form they were input to the PBKDF2 algorithm.
            This will result in the Authentication Data field being 33 +
            (length of auth_id in octets) + (4, for pepper identifier,
            when present) octets in length.

            Continuing the previous example, the Authentication Data
            field will be populated with (in hex, line wrap for
            readability):

            < 16 octets of mac > | 54434534543445435465768789099880 |
            04 | c0000205

            Note: Since in this case (i.e., when the P bit is set)
            successful authentication of the peer by the EAP server will
            be followed by the transmission of an EAP-Request of type
            POTP-X containing a Confirm TLV for mutual authentication,
            the peer MUST save either all the input parameters to the
            PBKDF2 computation or the keys K_MAC, K_ENC, SRK, MSK, and
            EMSK (recommended, since they will be used later).  This is
            because the peer cannot be guaranteed to be able to generate
            the same OTP value again.  For the same reason (the Confirm-
            TLV from the EAP server), the peer MUST also store either
            the hash of the contents of the sent EAP-Response or the
            EAP-Response itself (but see the note above about not
            including any User Identifier TLVs in the hash computation).

            Given a set of possible OTP values, the authentication
            server verifies an authentication request from the peer by
            computing

            K_MAC' | K_ENC' | MSK' | EMSK' | SRK' = PBKDF2 (otp',
              salt | pepper' | auth_id, iteration_count, key_length)

            for each possible OTP value otp' and each possible pepper
            value pepper' , and the provided values for salt,
            authenticator identity, and iteration count, as well as the
            applicable key length (default: 176).  Note: Doing the
            computation for each possible pepper value implements the
            pepper search mentioned elsewhere in this document.  Note
            also that the EAP server may accept more than one OTP value



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


            at a given time, e.g., due to clock drift in the token.  If
            the given pepper length is not a multiple of 8, each tested
            pepper value will be padded to the left to the nearest
            multiple of 8, in the same manner as was done by the peer.
            If the server already shares a secret pepper value with this
            peer, then obviously there will only be one possible pepper
            value, and the server will find it based on the
            pepper_identifier provided by the peer.  The server SHALL
            send a new EAP-Request of type POTP-X with an OTP TLV with
            the E bit set if the peer provided a pepper identifier
            unknown to the server.

            For each K_MAC', the EAP server computes

            mac' = MAC(K_MAC', msg_hash(msg_1', msg_2', ..., msg_n'))

            where MAC is the negotiated MAC algorithm, msg_hash is the
            message hash algorithm defined in Section 4.9, and msg_1',
            msg_2', ... msg_n' are the same messages on which the peer
            calculated its message hash, but this time, as sent and
            received by the EAP server.  If the first 16 octets of mac'
            matches the first 16 octets in the Authentication Data field
            of the EAP-Response in question, and the provided
            authenticator identity is acceptable (e.g., matches the EAP
            server's view of the authenticator's identity), then the
            peer is authenticated.

            If the authentication is successful, the authentication
            server then attempts to authenticate itself to the peer by
            use of the Confirm TLV (see below).  If the authentication
            fails, the EAP server MAY send another EAP-Request of type
            POTP-X containing an OTP TLV to the peer, or it MAY send an
            EAP-Failure message (in both cases, possibly preceded by an
            EAP-Request of type Notification).

4.11.4.  NAK TLV

   Presence of this TLV indicates that the peer did not support a
   received TLV with the M bit set.  This TLV may occur 0, 1, or more
   times in an EAP-Response of type POTP-X.  Each occurrence flags the
   non-support of a particular received TLV.

   The NAK TLV MUST be supported by all peers and all EAP servers
   conforming to this specification and MUST NOT be responded to with a
   NAK TLV.  Receipt of a NAK TLV by an EAP server MAY cause an
   authentication to fail, and the EAP server to send an EAP-Failure
   message to the peer.




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Note: The definition of the NAK TLV herein matches the definition
   made in [17], and has the same type number.  Field descriptions are
   copied from that document, with some minor modifications.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          Vendor-Id                            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            NAK-Type           |           TLVs ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      1 - Mandatory TLV

   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   TLV Type

      4

   Length

      6 + cumulative total length of embedded TLVs

   Vendor-Id

      The Vendor-Id field is 4 octets, and contains the Vendor-Id of the
      TLV that was not supported.  The high-order octet is 0 and the
      low-order 3 octets are the Structure of Management Information
      (SMI) Network Management Private Enterprise Code of the Vendor in
      network byte order.  The Vendor-Id field MUST be zero for TLVs
      that are not Vendor-Specific TLVs.  For Vendor-Specific TLVs, the
      Vendor-ID MUST be set to the SMI code.

   NAK-Type

   The type of the unsupported TLV.  The TLV MUST have been included in
   the most recently received EAP message.





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   TLVs

   This field contains a list of TLVs, each of which MUST NOT have the
   mandatory bit set.  These optional TLVs can be used in the future to
   communicate why the offending TLV was determined to be unsupported.

4.11.5.  New PIN TLV

   In an EAP-Request, the New PIN TLV is used to request a new user PIN
   from the peer.  The EAP server MAY provide a new PIN, as described
   below.  In an EAP-Response, the New PIN TLV carries a chosen new user
   PIN.  This TLV may be used by an EAP server when policy dictates that
   the peer (user) needs to change a PIN associated with the OTP Token.

   This TLV type SHOULD be supported by peers and EAP servers conforming
   to this specification.  The New PIN TLV MUST NOT be sent by an EAP
   server unless the peer has been authenticated.  If the peer was
   authenticated in protected mode, then the New PIN TLV MUST NOT be
   present in an EAP-Request until after the exchange of the Confirm TLV
   (i.e., until after mutual authentication has occurred and keys are in
   place to protect the TLV).  The New PIN TLV MUST be sent by a peer if
   and only if the EAP-Request that triggered the response contained a
   New PIN TLV, it was valid for the EAP server to send such a TLV in
   that request, and the TLV is supported by the peer.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Reserved  |Q|A|  PIN Length   |             PIN ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Min. PIN Length|Max. PIN Length|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      1 - Mandatory TLV

   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   TLV Type

      5



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Length

      2 + length of the PIN field (as specified in the PIN Length field)
        + (0, 1, or 2)

      Note: The final term above is
      -  0 if none of the optional Min. / Max. PIN Length fields is
           present in the TLV,
      -  1 if only the Min. PIN Length field is present in the TLV,
      -  2 if both of these optional fields are present in the TLV.

   Reserved

      Reserved for future use.  All six bits SHALL be set to zero for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore these bits for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   Q

      The Q bit, when set in an EAP-Request, indicates that an
      accompanying PIN is required, i.e., the peer (user) is not free to
      choose another PIN.  When the Q bit is set, there MUST be an
      accompanying PIN and the provided PIN MUST be used in subsequent
      OTP generations.  A peer SHALL respond with an empty POTP-X EAP-
      Response message if the Q bit is set but there is not any
      accompanying PIN.  When the Q bit is not set, any provided PIN is
      suggested only, and the peer is free to choose another PIN,
      subject to local policy.

      The Q bit carries no meaning, and SHALL be set to zero, in an EAP-
      Response.

   A

      This bit allows methods that distinguish between two different PIN
      types (e.g., decimal vs. alphanumeric) to designate whether the
      augmented set is to be used (when set) or not (when not set).  The
      A bit carries no meaning, and SHALL be set to zero, in an EAP-
      Response.

   PIN Length

      This field contains an unsigned integer representing the length of
      the provided PIN (this implies that the maximum length of a PIN
      will be 255 octets).






RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   PIN

      In an EAP-Request, subject to the setting of the Q bit, the PIN
      field MAY be empty.  If empty, the peer (user) will need to choose
      a PIN subject to local and (any) provided policy.  When the PIN
      field is not empty, it MUST consist of UTF-8 encoded printable
      characters without a terminating NULL character.

      In an EAP-Response, the PIN value SHALL consist of a UTF-8 encoded
      string of printable characters without a terminating NULL
      character.

      The peer accepts a PIN suggested by the EAP server by replying
      with the same PIN, but MAY replace it with another one, depending
      on the server's setting of the Q bit.  The length of the PIN is
      application-dependent, as are any other requirements for the PIN,
      e.g., allowed characters.  The peer MUST be prepared to receive a
      repeated request for a new PIN, as described above, if the EAP
      server, for some reason does not accept the received PIN.  Such a
      request MAY be preceded by an EAP-Request of type Notification (2)
      providing information to the user about the reason for the
      rejection.  Mechanisms for transferring knowledge about PIN
      requirements from the EAP server to the peer (beyond those
      specified for this TLV, such as maximal and minimal PIN length)
      are outside the scope of this document.  However, some information
      MAY be provided in notification messages transferred from the EAP
      server to the peer, as per above.

   Min. PIN Length

      This field MAY be present in an EAP-Request.  This field MUST NOT
      be present in an EAP-Response.  It SHALL be interpreted as an
      unsigned integer in network byte order representing the minimum
      length allowed for a new PIN.

   Max. PIN Length

      This field MUST NOT be present in an EAP-Request unless the Min.
      PIN Length field is present, in which case it MAY be present.  The
      field MUST NOT be present in an EAP-Response.  It SHALL be
      interpreted as an unsigned integer in network byte order
      representing the maximum length allowed for a new PIN.  The value
      of this field, when present, MUST be equal to, or larger than, the
      value of the Min. PIN Length field.







RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


4.11.6.  Confirm TLV

   Presence of this TLV in a request indicates that the EAP server has
   successfully authenticated the peer and now attempts to authenticate
   itself to the peer.  Presence of this TLV in a response indicates
   that the peer successfully authenticated the EAP server, and that
   calculated keys (K_MAC, K_ENC, MSK, EMSK, and SRK) now become
   available for use.

   The Confirm TLV MUST NOT appear together with any other TLV in an
   EAP-Request message of type POTP-X and MUST NOT be sent unless the
   peer has been authenticated through an OTP TLV with the P bit set or
   through a Resume TLV for which the underlying session was established
   in protected mode.  The Confirm TLV MUST be present in an EAP-
   Response if and only if the request that triggered the response
   contained a Confirm TLV, it was legal for it to do so, and the
   Confirm TLV authenticated the EAP server to the peer.  If the peer
   was not able to authenticate the server, then it MUST send an empty
   (i.e., no TLVs present) EAP-Response of type POTP-X.

   An EAP server MUST send an EAP-Success message after receiving an
   EAP-Response of type POTP-X containing a valid Confirm TLV, sent in
   response to an EAP-Request containing a Confirm TLV where the C bit
   was not set.  A peer MUST NOT accept an EAP-Success message when it
   has sent an OTP TLV with the P bit set unless it has received an
   acceptable Confirm TLV from the EAP server.

   This TLV type MUST be supported by all peers and EAP servers
   conforming to this specification and MUST NOT be responded to with a
   NAK TLV.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Reserved  |C|       Authentication Data ... (16 octets)
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      Pepper Identifier                        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                              IV ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                Encrypted Pepper ... (16 octets)
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      1 - Mandatory TLV



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   TLV Type

      6

   Length

      17 or 37 + length of IV in requests, 1 in responses.

   Reserved

      Reserved for future use.  These 7 bits SHALL be set to zero (0)
      for this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore these bits for this
      version of EAP-POTP.

   C

      The C bit, when set in an EAP-Request, indicates that the EAP
      server intends to send more EAP-Requests of type POTP-X in this
      session, after receipt of a Confirm TLV from the peer.

      The C bit carries no meaning in EAP-Responses, and MUST NOT be set
      within them.

      Note: An EAP-Response containing a Confirm TLV, sent in response
      to an EAP-Request containing a Confirm TLV that did not have the C
      bit set, MUST be followed by an EAP-Success message from the EAP
      server concluding the handshake.  However, when the C bit was set
      in an EAP-Request, the EAP server MAY send another EAP-Request
      (containing, for example, a New PIN TLV wrapped in a Protected
      TLV) rather than an EAP-Success message.  Therefore, peers MUST
      NOT assume that the only EAP message following an EAP-Response of
      type POTP-X containing a Confirm TLV is EAP-Success.  The C bit
      gives EAP servers a way to indicate their intent to follow the
      Confirm TLV with more requests, and allows the peer's state
      machine to adapt to this.

   Authentication Data

   EAP-Request:

         In a request, this field consists of the first 16 octets of
         (see also Section 4.11.3):



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


         mac_a = MAC(K_MAC', msg_hash(trig_msg))

         where

         MAC is the negotiated MAC algorithm,

         "K_MAC'" has been calculated as described in Section 4.11.3 or
         (in the case of session resumption) Section 4.11.8, and

         "msg_hash" is the message hash algorithm defined in Section
         4.9, and "trig_msg" the latest EAP-Response of type POTP-X
         received from the peer (the one which triggered this request).

         Given a saved or recomputed value for K_MAC, the peer
         authenticates the EAP server by computing

         mac'' = MAC(K_MAC, msg_hash(trig_msg'))

         where "msg_hash(trig_msg')" is the peer's hash of the EAP-
         Response message that it sent to the server (and that the
         server calculated its message hash on).  If the first 16 octets
         of mac'' matches the first 16 octets in the Authentication Data
         field of the EAP-Request in question, then the EAP server is
         authenticated.

   EAP-Response:

         Not used in this version, and SHALL NOT be present in EAP-
         Responses.

   Pepper Identifier

      In an EAP-Request, the truncated MAC MAY optionally be followed by
      an encrypted pepper and its identifier.  This initial, 4-octet
      field identifies a pepper generated by the server.

      For this version of EAP-POTP, this field SHALL NOT be present in
      EAP-Responses.

   IV (Initialization Vector)

      An initialization vector for the encryption.  The length of the
      vector is dependent on the negotiated encryption algorithm.  For
      example, for AES-CBC, it SHALL be 16 octets.  The IV is only
      present if a pepper is present, and the negotiated encryption
      algorithm makes use of an IV.  This field SHALL NOT be present in
      EAP-Response messages for this version of EAP-POTP.




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Encrypted Pepper

      When present in an EAP-Request, this will be a uniformly
      distributed and randomly chosen 16-octet pepper generated by the
      EAP server and encrypted with the negotiated encryption algorithm,
      using K_ENC as the encryption key and possibly (depending on the
      encryption algorithm) using an IV (stored in the IV field).  This
      field MUST be present if and only if the Pepper Identifier field
      is present.

      EAP servers are RECOMMENDED to include a freshly generated
      encrypted pepper (and a corresponding Pepper Identifier) in every
      Confirm TLV.

      This field SHALL NOT be present in EAP-Response messages for this
      version of EAP-POTP.

   When a new pepper is generated by the server and transferred in
   encrypted form to the peer, then this new pepper value will be stored
   in the EAP server upon receipt of the Confirm TLV from the peer, and
   SHOULD be stored with its identifier and associated with the EAP
   server and the current user in the peer upon receipt of the EAP-
   Success message.  If the peer already had a pepper stored for the EAP
   server, it SHALL replace it with the newly received one.

4.11.7.  Vendor-Specific TLV

   The Vendor-Specific TLV is available to allow vendors to support
   their own extended attributes not suitable for general usage.  A
   Vendor-Specific TLV can contain one or more inner TLVs, referred to
   as Vendor TLVs.  The TLV-type of a Vendor TLV will be defined by the
   vendor.  All the Vendor TLVs inside a single Vendor-Specific TLV
   SHALL belong to the same vendor.

   This TLV type MAY be sent by EAP servers, as well as by peers, and
   MUST be supported by all entities conforming to this specification.
   Conforming implementations may not support specific Vendor TLVs
   inside a Vendor-Specific TLV, however.  They MAY, in this case,
   respond to the Vendor TLVs with a NAK TLV containing the appropriate
   Vendor-ID and Vendor TLV type.

   The presence of a Vendor-Specific TLV in an EAP-Request or EAP-
   Response of type POTP-X MUST NOT violate any existing rules for
   coexistence of TLVs in such requests or responses.  If it does, then
   it will result in an EAP-Failure (when the peer made the violation)
   or an empty EAP-POTP response (when the EAP-server made the
   violation).  It is left to the definition of specific Vendor-Specific
   TLVs to further constrain when they are allowed to appear.  In



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   particular, EAP-POTP implementations may have policies that
   completely disallow use of the Vendor-Specific TLV before protected
   mode mutual authentication has occurred (since the Protected TLV,
   Section 4.11.15, then can be used to protect all TLVs).

   Note: This TLV type has the same definition and TLV type number as
   the Vendor-Specific TLV in [17], and the description of it is largely
   borrowed from that document.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          Vendor-Id                            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         Vendor TLVs ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      1 - Mandatory TLV

   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   TLV Type

      7

   Length

      4 + cumulative total length of inner Vendor TLVs

   Vendor-ID

      The Vendor-Id field is 4 octets.  The high-order octet SHALL be
      set to 0, and the low-order 3 octets SHALL be set to the SMI
      Network Management Private Enterprise Code (see [18]) of the
      Vendor in network byte order.








RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Vendor TLVs

      This field shall contain vendor-specific TLVs, in a format defined
      by the vendor.  To avoid fragmentation (i.e., EAP messages longer
      than the minimum EAP MTU size), the field SHOULD NOT be longer
      than 256 octets.

   To ensure interoperability when an EAP entity (peer or server) from
   vendor A sends a vendor-specific TLV that is not understood by the
   recipient EAP entity from vendor B, the vendor A entity SHALL, upon
   receipt of the NAK TLV from the recipient, refrain from usage of the
   vendor-specific TLV in question for the rest of the handshake, and
   MUST NOT fail the session due to the receipt of the NAK TLV for the
   Vendor TLV (i.e., it SHALL continue as if the vendor-specific TLV had
   not been sent).  Additionally, all implementations conformant with
   this document SHOULD allow use of vendor-specific extensions to be
   turned off via configuration.

4.11.8.  Resume TLV

   The Resume TLV MAY be sent by a peer to an authentication server to
   attempt session resumption.

   This TLV type MUST only be sent in response to an EAP-Request of type
   POTP-X containing a Server-Info TLV allowing session resumption.  The
   Resume TLV MUST be supported by all EAP servers that send a Server-
   Info TLV allowing session resumption.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Reserved    |               Session Identifier              |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                Session Identifier (continued)                 |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Sess.Id (cont.)|             Authentication Data               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                   Authentication Data (cont.) ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      0 - Non-mandatory TLV






RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   TLV Type

      8

   Length

      45

   Reserved

      Reserved for future use.  This octet SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this octet for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   Session Identifier

      An 8-octet identifier for the session the peer is trying to
      resume.

   Authentication Data

      Upon receipt of the Server-Info TLV, and if the N bit is not set,
      the peer searches for any stored sessions associated with the
      server identified by the Server Name field.  If a stored session
      is found, the peer generates a random, 16-octet nonce, "c_nonce",
      and calculates:

      K_MAC | K_ENC | MSK | EMSK | SRK = PBKDF2(base_key, c_nonce |
      s_nonce, iteration_count, key_length)

      where

      "|" denotes concatenation,

      "base_key" is either the current SRK for the session (if the
      session was created in protected mode) or the OTP used when the
      session was created (if the session was created in basic mode),

      "c_nonce" is the generated 16-octet nonce,

      "s_nonce" is the server nonce from the Server-Info TLV,




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


      "iteration_count" is the iteration count as determined by local
      policy, and

      "key_length" is the combined length of the desired key material,
      in octets.  When the default algorithms are used, key_length is
      176.

      The iteration count need only be 1 (one) when resuming a session
      established in protected mode, but MUST be chosen to provide a
      suitable level of protection when resuming a session established
      in basic mode (see also Section 4.11.3).

      Note: Session resumption for basic mode MUST only be carried out
      in a server-authenticated and protected tunnel that also provides
      a cryptographic binding for inner EAP methods.

      The peer then calculates:

      mac = MAC(K_MAC, msg_hash(resume_req))

      where

      "MAC" is the negotiated MAC algorithm, and

      "msg_hash(resume_req) is the message hash algorithm defined in
      Section 4.9 applied on resume_req, the EAP server's EAP-Request of
      type POTP-X containing the Server-Info TLV that allowed session
      resumption.

      The peer then places the first 16 octets of the MAC value,
      followed by the c_nonce value, followed by the iteration count
      value (as a 4-byte unsigned integer in network byte order), in the
      Authentication Data field.  As an example, when c_nonce =
      0x2b3b1b12babdebebfb43bd7bdfbeb8df and iteration_count = 1, the
      Authentication Data field will be populated with (in hex):

      < 16 octets of mac > | 2b3b1b12babdebebfb43bd7bdfbeb8df | 00000001

      The server authenticates the peer by performing the corresponding
      calculations.  If the authentication is successful, the server
      MUST send an EAP-Request of type POTP-X containing a Confirm TLV
      to the peer.  If the authentication fails, the server MUST either
      send an EAP-Request of type POTP-X containing an OTP TLV and a
      Server-Info TLV, where the Server-Info TLV indicates that session
      resumption is not possible, or send an EAP-Failure.






RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


      When resuming in basic mode, all calculated keys SHALL be
      discarded after the MAC has been calculated and verified.  When
      resuming in protected mode, the new SRK will replace the stored
      SRK, and the new MSK and EMSK will be exported upon successful
      completion of the method.

4.11.9.  User Identifier TLV

   The User Identifier TLV carries an identifier, typically the
   username, for the holder of the OTP token used to generate the OTP.

   At least one of the User Identifier TLV and the Token Key Identifier
   TLV SHOULD be present in the session's first EAP-Response of type
   POTP-X that also carries an OTP TLV unless a suitable identity has
   been provided in a preceding EAP-Response of type Identity (1) or is
   determined by some other means (see [1], Section 2).  Use of the User
   Identifier TLV and/or the Token Key Identifier TLV is RECOMMENDED
   even when an EAP-Response of type Identity (1) has been sent.  If a
   peer sends both a User Identifier TLV and a Token Key Identifier TLV,
   then the EAP server SHALL interpret the Token Key Identifier TLV as
   specifying a particular token key for the given user.  The EAP server
   MUST respond with an EAP-Failure if it cannot find a token key for
   the provided user.

   This TLV type is sent by peers and MUST be supported by all EAP
   servers conforming to this specification.  The User Identifier TLV
   MUST NOT be present in a response that does not also carry an OTP
   TLV.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                       User Identifier ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      1 - Mandatory TLV

   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   TLV Type

      9

   Length

      Length of User Identifier, >= 1

   User Identifier

      The value SHALL be an UTF-8 encoded string representing the holder
      of the token (MUST NOT be NULL-terminated).  The string MUST be
      less than 128 octets in length.

4.11.10.  Token Key Identifier TLV

   The Token Key Identifier TLV carries an identifier for the token key
   used to generate the OTP.

   At least one of the User Identifier TLV and the Token Key Identifier
   TLV SHOULD be present in the session's first EAP-Response of type
   POTP-X, which also carries the OTP TLV unless a suitable identity has
   been provided in a preceding EAP-Response of type Identity (1) or is
   determined by some other means (see [1], Section 2).  Use of the User
   Identifier TLV and/or the Token Key Identifier TLV is RECOMMENDED
   even when an EAP-Response of type Identity (1) has been sent.  If a
   peer sends both a User Identifier TLV and a Token Key Identifier TLV,
   then the EAP server SHALL interpret the Token Key Identifier TLV as
   specifying a particular token key for the given user.  The EAP server
   MUST respond with an EAP-Failure if it cannot find a token key
   corresponding to the provided token key identifier.

   This TLV type is sent by peers and MUST be supported by all EAP
   servers conforming to this specification.  The Token Key Identifier
   TLV MUST NOT be present in a response that does not also carry an OTP
   TLV.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                    Token Key Identifier ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      1 - Mandatory TLV



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   TLV Type

      10

   Length

      Length of Token Key Identifier, >= 1

   Token Key Identifier

      An identifier for the OTP token key used to generate the OTP.  The
      field MUST be less than 128 octets in length.

4.11.11.  Time Stamp TLV

   The Time Stamp TLV MAY be sent by peers to simplify authentications.
   When present, it carries the time as reported by the OTP Token.

   An EAP server conformant with this specification SHOULD support
   (i.e., recognize) this TLV, but need not be able to process or act on
   it.  An EAP server that does not support this TLV, but receives an
   EAP-Response with the TLV present, MAY ignore the value.  The Time
   Stamp TLV MUST NOT be present in any EAP-Responses of type POTP-X
   other than those that also carries an OTP TLV.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                       Time Stamp ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      0 - Non-mandatory TLV

   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   TLV Type

      11

   Length

      Length of Time Stamp field, >= 20 (depending on precision)

   Time Stamp

      The time, as reported by the OTP token, at which the OTP used for
      the accompanying OTP TLV was calculated.  The field SHALL contain
      a UTF-8 encoded value of the XML simple type "dateTime", with time
      zone information and precision down to at least seconds, e.g.,
      "2004-06-16T15:20:02Z".

4.11.12.  Counter TLV

   The Counter TLV MAY be sent by peers to simplify authentications.
   When present, it carries the token counter value, as reported by the
   OTP Token.

   An EAP server conformant with this specification SHOULD support
   (i.e., recognize) this TLV, but need not be able to process or act on
   it.  An EAP server that does not support this TLV, but receives an
   EAP-Response with the TLV present, MAY ignore the value.  The Counter
   TLV MUST NOT be present in any EAP-Responses of type POTP-X other
   than those that also carries an OTP TLV.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                            Counter ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      0 - Non-mandatory TLV

   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   TLV Type

      12

   Length

      Length of Counter field, >= 1 (depending on precision)

   Counter

      The counter value, as reported by the OTP token, at which the OTP
      used for the accompanying OTP TLV was calculated.  The counter
      value SHALL be represented as an unsigned integer in network-byte
      order, e.g., a counter value of 1030 may be sent as the 2 octets
      (in hex) 04 06.

4.11.13.  Challenge TLV

   The Challenge TLV carries the challenge used by the token to
   calculate the OTP, as reported by the token to the peer.  The
   Challenge TLV MUST be sent by a peer if and only if the challenge
   otherwise would be unknown to the EAP server (e.g., the token or peer
   modified a received challenge or generated its own challenge).

   An EAP server conformant with this specification SHOULD support
   (i.e., recognize) this TLV, but need not be able to process or act on
   it.  An EAP server that does not support this TLV, but receives an
   EAP-Response with the TLV present, MAY ignore the value.  The
   Challenge TLV MUST NOT be present in any EAP-Responses of type POTP-X
   other than those that also carry an OTP TLV.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Challenge ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      0 - Non-mandatory TLV

   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   TLV Type

      16

   Length

      Length of Challenge field, >= 1

   Challenge

      The challenge value that was used to calculate the OTP used for
      the accompanying OTP TLV.

4.11.14.  Keep-Alive TLV

   The Keep-Alive is used to avoid EAP-POTP timeouts.

   The Keep-Alive TLV MAY be sent by a peer to avoid timeouts when the
   peer has received an EAP-Request containing an OTP TLV or a New PIN
   TLV and is waiting for a response from the user.

   An EAP-Request containing a Keep-Alive TLV MUST be sent by an EAP
   server when the server receives an EAP-Response containing a Keep-
   Alive TLV, and the server has an outstanding request that did not
   contain a Keep-Alive TLV.  In this situation, the server does not
   need to re-transmit its latest outstanding request, but, due to the
   synchronous nature of EAP, it needs to send another request.  Re-
   transmission of the latest outstanding request could be confusing for
   the peer since the request would get a new Identifier value.  The
   Keep-Alive TLV MAY also be sent by an EAP server when the server
   detects that its processing time will exceed some locally configured
   threshold and may cause a network timeout.  In this case, the peer
   MUST respond with an EAP-Response containing a Keep-Alive TLV.

   This TLV type MUST be supported by all peers and all EAP servers
   conforming to this specification and MUST NOT be responded to with a
   NAK TLV.  The Keep-Alive TLV MUST NOT be sent in any other situations
   than the ones described above.  The Keep-Alive TLV MUST NOT be sent
   together with any other TLVs defined herein.  Implementations SHOULD
   also follow recommendations made in Section 4.3 of [1].

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   M

      1 - Mandatory TLV

   R

   Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for this
   version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version of EAP-
   POTP.

   TLV Type

      13

   Length

      0

4.11.15.  Protected TLV

   The Protected TLV SHALL be used to encrypt individual or multiple
   TLVs after successful exchange of the Confirm TLV (i.e., as soon as
   calculated keys have been confirmed).  The Protected TLV therefore
   wraps "ordinary" TLVs.

   This TLV type may be sent by EAP servers as well as by peers and MUST
   be supported by all peers conforming to this specification.  It
   SHOULD be supported by all EAP servers conforming to this
   specification (it need not be supported if a server never will have a
   need to continue a POTP-X conversation after exchange of the Confirm
   TLV).

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |          Message Authentication Code ... (16 octets)
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                             IV ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                       Encrypted TLVs ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      1 - Mandatory TLV




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.

   TLV Type

      14

   Length

      >32

   Message Authentication Code (MAC)

      This field integrity-protects the TLV.  The MAC SHALL be
      calculated over the IV and the Encrypted TLVs field in the
      following manner:

      mac = MAC(K_MAC, iv | encrypted_tlvs)

      where

      MAC is the negotiated MAC algorithm, "iv" is the IV field's value,
      and "encrypted_tlvs" is the value of the Encrypted TLVs field.
      The first 16 octets of the MAC is placed in the Message
      Authentication Code field.

      Recipients MUST verify the MAC.  If the verification fails, the
      conversation SHALL be terminated (i.e., peers send an empty POTP-X
      EAP-Response message, and EAP servers send an EAP-Failure message
      possibly preceded by an EAP-Request of type Notification).

   IV

      An initialization vector for the encryption; see below.  The
      length of the vector is dependent on the negotiated encryption
      algorithm, e.g., for AES-CBC, it shall be 16 octets.  For some
      encryption algorithms, there may not be any initialization vector.
      An IV, when present, shall be randomly chosen and non-predictable.

   Encrypted TLVs

      This field SHALL contain one or more encrypted POTP-X TLVs.  The
      encryption algorithm SHALL be as negotiated; use K_ENC as the
      encryption key, and use the IV field as the initialization vector




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


      (when applicable), to encrypt the concatenation of all the TLVs to
      be protected.

4.11.16.  Crypto Algorithm TLV

   The Crypto Algorithm TLV allows for negotiation of cryptographic
   algorithms.  Cryptographic Algorithm negotiation is described in
   detail in Section 4.3.

   This TLV MUST be present in the initial EAP-Request of type POTP-X
   that also carries an OTP TLV indicating protected mode, assuming the
   EAP server wants to negotiate use of any other algorithms than the
   default ones.  It MAY also be present in an EAP-Request of type
   POTP-X that carries an OTP TLV that is sent as a result of a failed
   session resumption (in this case, the peer has not yet responded to
   this TLV), or when the Crypto Algorithm TLV was part of the initial
   message from the EAP server, and the client negotiated another EAP-
   POTP version than the highest one supported by the EAP server.  The
   Crypto Algorithm TLV MUST NOT be present in any other EAP-Requests.
   Further, the Crypto Algorithm TLV MUST NOT be present in an EAP-
   Response of type POTP-X unless the preceding EAP-Request also
   contained it, and it was legal for it to do so.  This TLV MUST be
   supported by all peers and all EAP servers conforming to this
   specification and MUST NOT be responded to with a NAK TLV.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|          TLV Type         |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Reserved    |Hash Alg.Length|        Hash Algorithms ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Encr.Alg.Length|             Encryption Algorithms ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |MAC Alg. Length|                  MAC Algorithms ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      1 - Mandatory TLV

   R

      Reserved for future use.  This bit SHALL be set to zero (0) for
      this version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this bit for this version
      of EAP-POTP.





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   TLV Type

      15

   Length

      >=4 (at least one class of algorithms and one algorithm for that
      class needs to be present)

   Reserved

      Reserved for future use.  This octet MUST be set to zero for this
      version.  Recipients SHALL ignore this octet for this version of
      EAP-POTP.

   Hash Alg. Length

      The length of the Hash Algorithms field in octets.

   Hash Algorithms

      Each octet pair of this field represents a hash algorithm as
      follows.  An EAP server MAY supply several suggestions for hash
      algorithms.  Each algorithm MUST appear only once.  The algorithms
      SHALL be supplied in order of priority.  Peers MUST supply, at
      most, one algorithm (if none is present, the default applies).
      The defined values are:

        Value
   Octet 1 Octet 2  Hash algorithm
   ------- -------  ----------------------------------
   0x00    0x00     Reserved
   0x00    0x01     SHA-1
   0x00    0x02     SHA-224
   0x00    0x03     SHA-256 (default)
   0x00    0x04     SHA-384
   0x00    0x05     SHA-512
   0x80     -       Vendor-specific (or experimental)

      As indicated, values 0x8000 and higher are for proprietary
      vendor-specific algorithms.  Values in the range 0x0006 - 0x7fff
      are to be assigned through IANA; see Section 7.

   Encr Alg. Length

      The length of the Encryption Algorithms field in octets.





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Encryption Algorithms

      Each octet pair of this field represents an encryption algorithm
      as follows.  An EAP server MAY supply several suggestions for
      encryption algorithms.  Each algorithm MUST appear only once.  The
      algorithms SHALL be supplied in order of priority.  Peers MUST
      supply, at most, one algorithm (if none is present, the default
      applies).  The defined values are:

        Value
   Octet 1 Octet 2  Encryption algorithm
   ------- -------  ------------------------
   0x00    0x00     Reserved
   0x00    0x01     AES-CBC (default) with 128-bit keys and 16-octet IVs
   0x00    0x02     3DES-CBC with 112-bit keys and 8-octet IVs
   0x80     -       Vendor-specific

      As indicated, values 0x8000 and higher are for vendor-specific
      proprietary algorithms.  Values in the range 0x0003 - 0x7fff are
      to be assigned through IANA; see Section 7.

   MAC Alg. Length

      The length of the MAC Algorithms field in octets.

   MAC Algorithms

      Each octet pair of this field represents a MAC algorithm as
      follows.  An EAP server MAY supply several suggestions for MAC
      algorithms.  Each algorithm MUST appear only once.  The algorithms
      SHALL be supplied in order of priority.  Peers MUST supply, at
      most, one algorithm (if none is present, the default applies).
      The defined values are:

        Value
   Octet 1 Octet 2  MAC algorithm
   ------- -------  -----------------
   0x00    0x00     Reserved
   0x00    0x01     HMAC (default)
   0x80     -       Vendor-specific

      As indicated, values 0x8000 and higher are for vendor-specific
      proprietary algorithms.  Values in the range 0x0002 - 0x7fff are
      to be assigned through IANA; see Section 7.

      When HMAC is negotiated, the hash algorithm used for HMAC SHALL be
      the negotiated hash algorithm.




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


5.  EAP Key Management Framework Considerations

   In line with recommendations made in [16], EAP-POTP defines the
   following identifiers to be associated with generated key material:

      Peer-ID: The combined contents of the User Identifier TLV and the
      Token Key Identifier TLV.

      Server-ID: The contents of the Server Identifier field of the
      Server-Info TLV.

      Method-ID: The identifier of the established session (i.e., the
      contents of the Session Identifier field of the Server-Info TLV
      that defined the session).

6.  Security Considerations

6.1.  Security Claims

   In conformance with RFC 3748 [1], the following security claims are
   made for the EAP-POTP method:

   Authentication mechanism:  Generic OTP
   Ciphersuite negotiation:   Yes (No in basic variant)
   Mutual authentication:     Yes (No in basic variant)
   Integrity protection:      Yes (No in basic variant)
   Replay protection:         Yes (see below)
   Confidentiality:           Only in the OTP protection variant, and
                              then only OTP values and any information
                              sent after exchange of the Confirm TLV
   Key derivation:            Yes (No in basic variant)
   Key strength:              Depends on size of OTP value, strength of
                              underlying shared secret, strength and
                              characteristics of OTP algorithm, pepper
                              length, iteration count, and whether the
                              method is used within a tunnel such as
                              PEAPv2.  For some illustrative examples,
                              and a further discussion of this, see
                              Appendix D.
   Dictionary attack prot.:   N/A (Human-selected passwords not used)
   Fast reconnect:            Yes
   Crypt. binding:            N/A (EAP-POTP is not a tunnel method)
   Session independence:      Yes
   Fragmentation:             N/A (Packets shall not exceed MTU of 1020)
   Channel binding:           Yes (No in basic variant)
   Acknowledged S/F:          Yes
   State Synchronization:     Yes (No in basic variant)




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


6.2.  Passive and Active Attacks

   The basic variant (i.e., when the protection of OTPs and mutual
   authentication is not used) of this EAP method does not provide
   session privacy, session integrity, server authentication, or
   protection from active attacks.  In particular, man-in-the-middle
   attacks, where an attacker acts as an authenticator in order to
   acquire a valid OTP, are possible.

   Similarly, the basic variant of this EAP method does not protect
   against session hijacking taking place after authentication.  Nor
   does it, in itself, protect against replay attacks, where the
   attacker gains access by replaying a previous valid request, but see
   also the next subsection.  When PIN codes are transmitted, they are
   sent without protection and are also subject to replay attacks.

   In order to protect against these attacks, the peer MUST only use the
   basic variant of this method over a server-authenticated and
   confidentiality-protected connection.  This can be achieved via use
   of, PEAPv2 [17], for example.

   When the OTP protection variant is used, however, the EAP method
   provides privacy for OTPs and new PINs, negotiation of cryptographic
   algorithms, mutual authentication, and protection against replay
   attacks and protocol version downgrades.  It also provides protection
   against man-in-the-middle attacks, not due to the infeasibility for a
   man-in-the-middle to solve for a valid OTP given an OTP TLV, but due
   to the computational expense of finding the OTP in the limited time
   period during which it is valid (this is mainly true for tokens,
   including the current time in their OTP calculations, or when a sent
   challenge has a certain lifetime).  It should be noted, however, that
   a retrieved OTP, even if "old" and invalid, still may divulge some
   information about the user's PIN.  Clearly, this is also true for the
   basic variant.  Implementations of this EAP method, where user PINs
   are sent with OTPs, are therefore RECOMMENDED to ensure regular user
   PIN changes, regardless of whether the protected variant or the basic
   variant is employed.

   It should also be noted that, while it is possible for a rogue access
   point, e.g., to clone MAC addresses, and hence mount a man-in-the-
   middle attack, such an access point will not be able to calculate the
   session keys MSK and EMSK.  This demonstrates the importance of using
   the derived key material properly to protect a subsequent session.

   Protected mode protects against version downgrade attacks due to the
   HMAC both parties transmit in this mode.  As described, each party
   calculates the HMAC on sent and received EAP-POTP handshake messages.
   If an attacker were to modify a Version TLV, this would be reflected



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   in a difference between the calculated MACs (since the recipient of
   the Version TLV received a different value than the sender sent).
   Unless the attacker knows K_MAC, he cannot calculate the correct MAC,
   and hence the difference will be detected.

   The OTP protection variant also protects against session hijacking,
   if the derived key material is used (directly or indirectly) to
   protect a subsequent session.  For these reasons, use of the OTP
   protection variant is RECOMMENDED.

   However, it should be noted that not even the OTP protection variant
   provides privacy for user names and/or token key identifiers.  EAP-
   POTP MUST be used within a secure tunnel such as the one provided by
   PEAPv2 [17] if privacy for these parameters is required.

   When resuming sessions created in the basic variant (which MUST only
   take place within a protected tunnel), the peer is authenticated by
   demonstrating knowledge of not just a valid session identifier, but
   also the OTP used when the session was created.  Server nonces
   prevent replay attacks, but there still remains some likelihood of an
   attacker guessing the correct combination of session identifier and
   OTP value.  Assuming OTPs with entropy about 32 bits, this means that
   the likelihood of succeeding with such an attack is about 1/2^48 due
   to the birthday paradox.  Servers allowing session resumption for the
   basic variant MUST protect against such attacks, e.g., by keeping
   track of the rate of failed resumption attempts.

6.3.  Denial-of-Service Attacks

   An active attacker may replace the iteration count value in OTP TLVs
   sent by the peer to slow down an authentication server.
   Authentication servers SHOULD protect against this, e.g., by
   disregarding OTP TLVs with an iteration count value higher than some
   number that is preset or dynamically set (depending on load).

6.4.  The Use of Pepper

   As described in Section 4.8, the use of pepper will slow down an
   attacker's search for a matching OTP.  The ability to transfer a
   pepper value in encrypted form from the EAP server to the peer means
   that, even though there may be an initial computational cost for the
   EAP server to authenticate the peer, subsequent authentications will
   be efficient, while at the same time more secure, since a pre-shared,
   128-bit-long pepper value will not be easily found by an attacker.
   An attacker, observing an EAP-Request containing an OTP TLV
   calculated using a pepper chosen by the peer, may, however, depending
   on available resources, be able to successfully attack that
   particular EAP-POTP session, since it most likely will be based on a



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   relatively short pepper value or only an iteration count.  Once the
   correct OTP has been found, eavesdropping on the EAP server's Confirm
   TLV will potentially give the attacker access to the longer, server-
   provided pepper for the remaining lifetime of that pepper value.  For
   this reason, initial exchanges with EAP servers SHOULD occur in a
   secure environment (e.g., in a PEAPv2 tunnel offering cryptographic
   binding with inner EAP methods).  If initial exchanges do not occur
   in a secure environment, the iteration count MUST be significantly
   higher than for messages where a pre-shared pepper is used.  The
   lifetime of the shared pepper must also be calculated with this in
   mind.  Finally, the peer and the EAP server MUST store the pepper
   value securely and associated with the user.

6.5.  The Race Attack

   In the case of fragmentation of EAP messages, it is possible (in the
   basic variant of this method) for an attacker to listen to most of an
   OTP, guess the remainder, and then race the legitimate user to
   complete the authentication.  Conforming backend authentication
   server implementations MUST protect against this race condition.  One
   defense against this attack is outlined below and borrowed from [14];
   implementations MAY use this approach or MAY select an alternative
   defense.  Note that the described defense relies on the user
   providing the identity in response to an initial Identity EAP-
   Request.

   One possible defense is to prevent a user from starting multiple
   simultaneous authentication sessions.  This means that once the
   legitimate user has initiated authentication, an attacker would be
   blocked until the first authentication process has completed.  In
   this approach, a timeout is necessary to thwart a denial-of-service
   attack.

7.  IANA Considerations

7.1.  General

   This document is a description of a general EAP method for OTP
   tokens.  It also defines EAP method 32 as a profile of the general
   method.  Extending the set of EAP-POTP TLVs or the set of EAP-POTP
   cryptographic algorithms shall be seen as revisions of the protocol
   and hence shall require an RFC that updates or obsoletes this
   document.








RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


7.2.  Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier Octets

   A new registry for EAP-POTP cryptographic algorithm identifier octets
   has been created.  The initial contents of this registry are as
   specified in Section 4.11.16.

   Assignment of new values for hash algorithms, encryption algorithms,
   and MAC algorithms in the Crypto Algorithm TLV MUST be done through
   IANA with "Specification Required" and "IESG Approval" (see [9] for
   the meaning of these terms).

8.  Intellectual Property Considerations

   RSA, RSA Security, and SecurID are either registered trademarks or
   trademarks of RSA Security Inc. in the United States and/or other
   countries.  The names of other products and services mentioned may be
   the trademarks of their respective owners.

9.  Acknowledgments

   This document was improved by comments from, and discussion with, a
   number of RSA Security employees.  Simon Josefsson drafted the
   initial versions of an RSA SecurID EAP method while working for RSA
   Laboratories.  The inspiration for the TLV-type of information
   exchange comes from [17].  Special thanks to Oliver Tavakoli of Funk
   Software who provided numerous useful comments and suggestions, Randy
   Chou of Aruba Networks for good suggestions in the session resumption
   area, and Jim Burns of Meetinghouse who provided inspiration for the
   Protected TLV.  Thanks also to the IESG reviewers, Pasi Eronen, David
   Black, and Uri Blumenthal, for insightful comments that helped to
   improve the document, and to Alfred Hoenes for a thorough editorial
   review.



















RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [1]   Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Aboba, B., Carlson, J., and H.
         Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
         3748, June 2004.

   [2]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
         Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [3]   National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash
         Standard", FIPS 180-2, February 2004.

   [4]   National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Specification
         for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS 197, November
         2001.

   [5]   Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
         for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.

   [6]  Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification
         Version 2.0", RFC 2898, September 2000.

   [7]   Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", STD
         63, RFC 3629, November 2003.

   [8]   Schulzrinne, H., "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers", RFC 3966,
         December 2004.

   [9]   Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
         Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 2434, October 1998.

10.2.  Informative References

   [10]  Simpson, W., Ed., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD 51,
         RFC 1661, July 1994.

   [11]  The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.,
         "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks --
         Port-Based Network Access Control", IEEE 802.1X-2001, July
         2001.

   [12]  Kaufman, C., Ed., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC
         4306, December 2005.






RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   [13]  Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
         Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless
         LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.

   [14]  Haller, N., Metz, C., Nesser, P., and M. Straw, "A One-Time
         Password System", STD 61, RFC 2289, February 1998.

   [15]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote
         Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June
         2000.

   [16]  Aboba, B., Simon, D., Eronen, P., and H. Levkowetz, Ed.,
         "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management
         Framework", Work in Progress, October 2006.

   [17]  Palekar, A., Simon, D., Zorn, G., Salowey, J., Zhou, H., and S.
         Josefsson, "Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2", Work in
         Progress, October 2004.

   [18]  Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "Private Enterprise
         Numbers", December 2006.

   [19]  Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes", RFC
         2548, March 1999.



























RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


Appendix A.  Profile of EAP-POTP for RSA SecurID

   Note: The RSA SecurID product is a hardware token card (or software
   emulation thereof) produced by RSA Security Inc., which is used for
   end-user authentication.

   The EAP method type identifier for the RSA SecurID profile of EAP-
   POTP is 32.

   Peers and EAP servers implementing the SecurID profile of EAP-POTP
   SHALL conform to all EAP-POTP normative requirements in this
   Document.  In addition, the New PIN TLV and the Protected TLV MUST be
   supported by peers.






































RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


Appendix B.  Examples of EAP-POTP Exchanges

   This appendix is non-normative.  In the examples, "V1", "V2", "V3",
   etc., stand for arbitrary values of the correct type.

B.1.  Basic Mode, Unilateral Authentication

   This mode should only be used within a secured tunnel.  The peer
   identifies itself with a User Identifier TLV.

   Peer                                 EAP server

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=Identity

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=Identity

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Version TLV:
                                           Highest=0,Lowest=0

                                           OTP TLV:
                                           P=0,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Version TLV:
   Highest=0

   OTP TLV:
   P=0,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
   Authentication Data=V1

   User Identifier TLV:
   User Identifier=V2

                                        <- EAP-Success










RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


B.2.  Basic Mode, Session Resumption

   This example illustrates successful resumption of a basic mode
   session.  It must be carried out only in a protected tunnel.

   Peer                                 EAP server

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=Identity

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=Identity

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Version TLV:
                                           Highest=0,Lowest=0

                                           OTP TLV:
                                           P=0,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0

                                           Server-Info TLV:
                                           N=0
                                           Session Identifier=V1
                                           Server  Identifier=V2
                                           Nonce=V3
   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Version TLV:
   Highest=0

   Resume TLV:
   Session Identifier=V4 (indicating earlier, basic mode, session)
   Authentication Data=V5

                                        <- EAP-Success













RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


B.3.  Mutual Authentication without Session Resumption

   In this case, the peer uses the token key identifier, in addition to
   the user identifier.  The initial EAP-Identity exchange may also
   provide user information, or may be restricted to only general domain
   information.  Pepper is not used, but will be used in a subsequent
   session since the server provides the peer with an encrypted pepper
   in its Confirm TLV.  Absence of the Crypto Algorithm TLV indicates
   use of default cryptographic algorithms.

   Peer                                 EAP server

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=Identity

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=Identity

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Version TLV:
                                           Highest=0,Lowest=0

                                           Server-Info TLV:
                                           N=0
                                           Session Identifier=V1
                                           Server  Identifier=V2
                                           Nonce=V3

                                           OTP TLV:
                                           P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
                                           Pepper Length=0
                                           Iteration Count=V4

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Version TLV:
   Highest=0

   OTP TLV:
   P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
   Pepper Length=0
   Iteration Count=V4
   Authentication Data=V5





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   User Identifier TLV:
   User Identifier=V6

   Token Key Identifier TLV:
   Token Key Identifier=V7

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Confirm TLV:
                                           C=0
                                           Authentication Data=V8
                                           Pepper Identifier=V9
                                           Encrypted Pepper=V10

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Confirm TLV:
   (no data)

                                        <- EAP-Success





























RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


B.4.  Mutual Authentication with Transfer of Pepper

   The difference between this example and the previous one is that the
   peer makes use of an existing pepper in the PBKDF2 computation.  The
   EAP server provides a new pepper to the peer in the Confirm TLV.
   Note that the peer had not been able to use a pepper in the response
   calculation unless it had found the existing pepper, since the server
   specified a maximum (new) pepper length of zero.

   Peer                                 EAP server

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=Identity

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=Identity

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Version TLV:
                                           Highest=0,Lowest=0

                                           Server-Info TLV:
                                           N=0
                                           Session Identifier=V1
                                           Server  Identifier=V2
                                           Nonce=V3

                                           OTP TLV:
                                           P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
                                           Pepper Length=0
                                           Iteration Count=V4

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Version TLV:
   Highest=0

   OTP TLV:
   P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
   Pepper Length=V5
   Iteration Count=V6
   Authentication Data=V7
   (includes a pepper identifier)





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   User Identifier TLV:
   User Identifier=V8

   Token Key Identifier TLV:
   Token Key Identifier=V9

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Confirm TLV:
                                           C=0
                                           Authentication Data=V10
                                           Pepper Identifier=V11
                                           Encrypted Pepper=V12

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Confirm TLV:
   (no data)

                                        <- EAP-Success
B.5.  Failed Mutual Authentication

   This example differs from the previous one in that the peer is not
   able to authenticate the server.  Therefore, it sends an empty EAP-
   Response of type POTP-X, which the EAP server acknowledges by
   responding with an EAP-Failure.  Pepper is not used.

   Peer                                 EAP server

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=Identity

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=Identity

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Version TLV:
                                           Highest=0,Lowest=0

                                           OTP TLV:
                                           P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
                                           Pepper Length=V1
                                           Iteration Count=V2




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


                                           Server-Info TLV:
                                           N=0
                                           Session Identifier=V3
                                           Server  Identifier=V4
                                           Nonce=V5

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Version TLV:
   Highest=0

   OTP TLV:
   P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
   Pepper Length=V1
   Iteration Count=V2
   Authentication Data=V6

   User Identifier TLV:
   User Identifier=V7

   Token Key Identifier TLV:
   Token Key Identifier=V8

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Confirm TLV:
                                           C=0
                                           Authentication Data=V9

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   (no data)

                                        <- EAP-Failure

B.6.  Session Resumption

   This example illustrates successful session resumption.

   Peer                                 EAP server

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=Identity





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   EAP-Response ->
   Type=Identity

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Version TLV:
                                           Highest=0,Lowest=0

                                           OTP TLV:
                                           P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
                                           Pepper Length=V1
                                           Iteration Count=V2

                                           Server-Info TLV:
                                           N=0
                                           Session Identifier=V3
                                           Server  Identifier=V4
                                           Nonce=V5

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Version TLV:
   Highest=0

   Resume TLV:
   Session Identifier=V6 (indicating earlier, protected mode, session)
   Authentication Data=V7

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Confirm TLV:
                                           C=0
                                           Authentication Data=V8

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X
   Confirm TLV:
   (no data)

                                        <- EAP-Success








RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


B.7.  Failed Session Resumption

   This example illustrates a failed session resumption, followed by a
   complete mutual authentication.  The user is identified through the
   User Identifier TLV.  The client is able to reuse an older pepper.
   The server sends a new pepper for subsequent use in its Confirm TLV.
   The server suggests some non-default cryptographic algorithms, but
   the client only supports the default ones.

   Peer                                 EAP server

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=Identity

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=Identity

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Version TLV:
                                           Highest=0,Lowest=0

                                           OTP TLV:
                                           P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
                                           Pepper Length=V1
                                           Iteration Count=V2

                                           Server-Info TLV:
                                           N=0
                                           Session Identifier=V3
                                           Server  Identifier=V4
                                           Nonce=V5

                                           Crypto Algorithm TLV:
                                           Hash Alg. Length=V6
                                           Hash Algorithms=V7
                                           Encr. Alg. Length=V8
                                           Encr. Algorithms=V9
                                           MAC Alg. Length=V10
                                           MAC Algorithms=V11

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Version TLV:
   Highest=0




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Resume TLV:
   Session Identifier=V12 (indicating earlier session)
   Authentication Data=V13

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           OTP TLV:
                                           P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
                                           Pepper Length=V14
                                           Iteration Count=V15

                                           Server-Info TLV:
                                           N=1 (no resumption)
                                           Session Identifier=V3
                                           Server  Identifier=V4
                                           Nonce=V16

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   OTP TLV:
   P=1,C=0,N=1,T=1,E=0,R=0
   Pepper Length=V17
   Iteration Count=V18
   Authentication Data=V19 (with pepper identifier)

   User Identifier TLV:
   User Identifier=V20

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Confirm TLV:
                                           C=0
                                           Authentication Data=V21
                                           Pepper Identifier=V22
                                           Encrypted Pepper=V23
   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Confirm TLV:
   (no data)

                                        <- EAP-Success






RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


B.8.  Mutual Authentication, and New PIN Requested.

   In this example, the user is also requested to select a new PIN.  The
   new PIN is allowed to be alphanumeric, and must be at least 6
   characters long.  The user selects another PIN than the one suggested
   by the server.  The token key is identified through a combination of
   the user identifier and the token key identifier.  While waiting for
   the user input, to avoid network timeouts, the peer sends an EAP-
   Response containing a Keep-Alive TLV to the EAP server.  The EAP
   server responds by sending an EAP-Request containing a Keep-Alive TLV
   back to the peer.  Note that all TLVs exchanged after the Confirm TLV
   exchange are wrapped in the Protected TLV.  Absence of the Crypto
   Algorithm TLV indicates use of default cryptographic algorithms.

   Peer                                 EAP server

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=Identity

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=Identity

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Version TLV:
                                           Highest=0,Lowest=0

                                           OTP TLV:
                                           P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
                                           Pepper Length=V1
                                           Iteration Count=V2

                                           Server-Info TLV:
                                           N=0
                                           Session Identifier=V3
                                           Server  Identifier=V4
                                           Nonce=V5

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Version TLV:
   Highest=0

   OTP TLV:
   P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
   Pepper Length=V6



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Iteration Count=V7
   Authentication Data=V8 (with pepper identifier)

   User Identifier TLV:
   User Identifier=V9

   Token Key Identifier TLV:
   Token Key Identifier=V10

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Confirm TLV:
                                           C=1
                                           Authentication Data=V11

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Confirm TLV:
   (no data)

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Protected TLV:
                                           MAC=V12
                                           IV=V13
                                           Encrypted TLVs=V14
                                           (Contains:
                                           New PIN TLV:
                                           Q=0,A=1
                                           PIN=V15
                                           Min. PIN Length=6)

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Protected TLV:
   MAC=V16
   IV=V17
   Encrypted TLVs=V18
   (Contains:
   Keep-Alive TLV:
   (no data))

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


                                           Protected TLV:
                                           MAC=V19
                                           IV=V20
                                           Encrypted TLVs=V21
                                           (Contains:
                                           Keep-Alive TLV:
                                           (no data))

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Protected TLV:
   MAC=V22
   IV=V23
   Encrypted TLVs=V24
   (Contains:
   New PIN TLV:
   Q=0,A=0
   PIN=V25)

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Protected TLV:
                                           MAC=V26
                                           IV=V27
                                           Encrypted TLVs=V28
                                           (Contains:
                                           OTP TLV:
                                           P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
                                           Pepper Length=V1
                                           Iteration Count=V2)

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Protected TLV
   MAC=V29
   IV=V30
   Encrypted TLVs=V31
   (Contains:
   OTP TLV:
   P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
   Pepper Length=V6
   Iteration Count=V7
   Authentication Data=V31)





RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Protected TLV
                                           MAC=V32
                                           IV=V33
                                           Encrypted TLVs=V34
                                           (Contains:
                                           Confirm TLV:
                                           C=0
                                           Authentication Data=V35)

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Protected TLV
   MAC=V36
   IV=V37
   Encrypted TLVs=V38
   (Contains:
   Confirm TLV:
   (no data))

                                        <- EAP-Success

B.9.  Use of Next OTP Mode

   In this example, the peer is requested to provide a second OTP to the
   EAP server.

   Peer                                 EAP server

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=Identity

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=Identity

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Version TLV:
                                           Highest=0,Lowest=0

                                           OTP TLV:
                                           P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
                                           Pepper Length=V1
                                           Iteration Count=V2



RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


                                           Server-Info TLV:
                                           N=0
                                           Session Identifier=V3
                                           Server  Identifier=V4
                                           Nonce=V5

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   Version TLV:
   Highest=0

   OTP TLV:
   P=1,C=0,N=0,T=0,E=0,R=0
   Pepper Length=V6
   Iteration Count=V7
   Authentication Data=V8

   User Identifier TLV:
   User Identifier=V9

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           OTP TLV:
                                           P=1,C=0,N=1,T=1,E=0,R=0
                                           Pepper Length=V1
                                           Iteration Count=V2

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X

   OTP TLV:
   P=1,C=0,N=1,T=1,E=0,R=0
   Pepper Length=V6
   Iteration Count=V7
   Authentication Data=V10

                                        <- EAP-Request
                                           Type=OTP-X

                                           Confirm TLV:
                                           C=0
                                           Authentication Data=V11

   EAP-Response ->
   Type=OTP-X




RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


   Confirm TLV:
   (no data)

                                        <- EAP-Success

Appendix C.  Use of the MPPE-Send/Receive-Key RADIUS Attributes

C.1.  Introduction

   This section describes how to populate the MPPE-Send-Key and the
   MPPE-Receive-Key RADIUS attributes defined in [19], using an MSK
   established in EAP-POTP.

C.2.  MPPE Key Attribute Population

   Once the EAP-POTP MSK has been generated, it is used as follows to
   populate the MPPE-Send-Key and the MPPE-Receive-Key attributes:

   Use the initial 32 octets of the MSK as the value for the "Key" sub-
   field in the plaintext "String" field of the MPPE-Send-Key attribute,
   and use the final 32 octets of the MSK as the "Key" sub-field in the
   plaintext "String" field of the MPPE-Receive-Key attribute (Note:
   "Send" and "Receive" here refer to the Authenticator; for the peer,
   they are reversed).

Appendix D.  Key Strength Considerations

D.1.  Introduction

   As described in Section 6, the strength of keys generated in EAP-POTP
   protected mode depends on a number of factors.  This appendix
   provides examples of actual key strengths achieved under various
   assumptions.

   It should be noted that, while some of the examples indicate that the
   strength of generated keys is relatively weak, the strength applies
   only to those EAP-POTP sessions between a peer and an EAP server that
   do not share a pepper.  Once a pepper, provided by an EAP server to a
   peer, has been established, future sessions using this pepper will
   provide full-strength keys.











RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


D.2.  Example 1: 6-Digit One-Time Passwords

   In this example we assume the following:

      OTPs are six decimal digits long;

      4-digit PINs are added to generated OTPs; and

      OTP hardening (iteration count and pepper searching combined)
      effectively adds 10 bits of entropy.  One way of achieving this
      without use of pepper searching is to have the iteration count in
      PBKDF2 set to 1,000,000.

   The effective key strength then becomes roughly:

   log_2(10**6) + log_2(10**4) + log_2(2**10) = 43 bits

   The above assumes that the entropy of the underlying shared secret is
   >43 bits and that there are no other weaknesses in the OTP algorithm.

D.3.  Example 2: 8-Digit One-Time Passwords

   In this example we assume the following:

      OTPs are eight decimal digits long;

      4-character alphanumeric PINs are added to generated OTPs; and

      OTP hardening (iteration count and pepper searching combined)
      effectively adds 10 bits of entropy.

   The effective key strength then becomes roughly:

   log_2(10**8) + log_2(26**4) + log_2(2**10) = 55 bits

   The above assumes that the entropy of the underlying shared secret is
   >55 bits and that there are no other weaknesses in the OTP algorithm.

Author's Address

   Magnus Nystroem
   RSA Security

   EMail: magnus@rsa.com







RFC 4793                        EAP-POTP                   February 2007


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