Rfc9396
TitleOAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests
AuthorT. Lodderstedt, J. Richer, B. Campbell
DateMay 2023
Format:HTML, TXT, PDF, XML
Status:PROPOSED STANDARD





Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                    T. Lodderstedt
Request for Comments: 9396                                       yes.com
Category: Standards Track                                      J. Richer
ISSN: 2070-1721                                      Bespoke Engineering
                                                             B. Campbell
                                                           Ping Identity
                                                                May 2023


                 OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests

Abstract

   This document specifies a new parameter authorization_details that is
   used to carry fine-grained authorization data in OAuth messages.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9396.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
   in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
     1.1.  Conventions and Terminology
   2.  Request Parameter "authorization_details"
     2.1.  Authorization Details Types
     2.2.  Common Data Fields
   3.  Authorization Request
     3.1.  Relationship to the "scope" Parameter
     3.2.  Relationship to the "resource" Parameter
   4.  Authorization Response
   5.  Authorization Error Response
   6.  Token Request
     6.1.  Comparing Authorization Details
   7.  Token Response
     7.1.  Enriched Authorization Details in Token Response
   8.  Token Error Response
   9.  Resource Servers
     9.1.  JWT-Based Access Tokens
     9.2.  Token Introspection
   10. Metadata
   11. Implementation Considerations
     11.1.  Using Authorization Details in a Certain Deployment
     11.2.  Minimal Implementation Support
     11.3.  Use of Machine-Readable Type Schemas
     11.4.  Large Requests
   12. Security Considerations
   13. Privacy Considerations
   14. IANA Considerations
     14.1.  OAuth Parameters Registration
     14.2.  JSON Web Token Claims Registration
     14.3.  OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration
     14.4.  OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration
     14.5.  OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration
     14.6.  OAuth Extensions Error Registration
   15. References
     15.1.  Normative References
     15.2.  Informative References
   Appendix A.  Additional Examples
     A.1.  OpenID Connect
     A.2.  Remote Electronic Signing
     A.3.  Access to Tax Data
     A.4.  eHealth
   Acknowledgements
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749] defines the scope
   parameter that allows OAuth clients to specify the requested scope,
   i.e., the limited capability, of an access token.  This mechanism is
   sufficient to implement static scenarios and coarse-grained
   authorization requests, such as "give me read access to the resource
   owner's profile."  However, it is not sufficient to specify fine-
   grained authorization requirements, such as "please let me transfer
   an amount of 45 Euros to Merchant A" or "please give me read access
   to directory A and write access to file X."

   This specification introduces a new parameter authorization_details
   that allows clients to specify their fine-grained authorization
   requirements using the expressiveness of JSON [RFC8259] data
   structures.

   For example, an authorization request for a credit transfer
   (designated as "payment initiation" in several open banking
   initiatives) can be represented using a JSON object like this:

   {
      "type": "payment_initiation",
      "locations": [
         "https://example.com/payments"
      ],
      "instructedAmount": {
         "currency": "EUR",
         "amount": "123.50"
      },
      "creditorName": "Merchant A",
      "creditorAccount": {
         "bic":"ABCIDEFFXXX",
         "iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
      },
      "remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
   }

    Figure 1: Example of an Authorization Request for a Credit Transfer

   This object contains detailed information about the intended payment,
   such as amount, currency, and creditor, that is required to inform
   the user and obtain their consent.  The authorization server (AS) and
   the respective resource server (RS) (providing the payment initiation
   API) will together enforce this consent.

   For a comprehensive discussion of the challenges arising from new use
   cases in the open banking and electronic signing spaces, see
   [Transaction-Auth].

   In addition to facilitating custom authorization requests, this
   specification also introduces a set of common data type fields for
   use across different APIs.

1.1.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This specification uses the terms "access token", "refresh token",
   "authorization server" (AS), "resource server" (RS), "authorization
   endpoint", "authorization request", "authorization response", "token
   endpoint", "grant type", "access token request", "access token
   response", and "client" defined by "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
   Framework" [RFC6749].

2.  Request Parameter "authorization_details"

   The request parameter authorization_details contains, in JSON
   notation, an array of objects.  Each JSON object contains the data to
   specify the authorization requirements for a certain type of
   resource.  The type of resource or access requirement is determined
   by the type field, which is defined as follows:

   type:  An identifier for the authorization details type as a string.
      The value of the type field determines the allowable contents of
      the object that contains it.  The value is unique for the
      described API in the context of the AS.  This field is REQUIRED.

   An authorization_details array MAY contain multiple entries of the
   same type.

   Figure 2 shows an authorization_details of type payment_initiation
   using the example data shown above:

   [
      {
         "type": "payment_initiation",
         "actions": [
            "initiate",
            "status",
            "cancel"
         ],
         "locations": [
            "https://example.com/payments"
         ],
         "instructedAmount": {
            "currency": "EUR",
            "amount": "123.50"
         },
         "creditorName": "Merchant A",
         "creditorAccount": {
            "iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
         },
         "remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
      }
   ]

     Figure 2: Example of "authorization_details" for a Credit Transfer

   Figure 3 shows a combined request asking for access to account
   information and permission to initiate a payment:

   [
      {
         "type": "account_information",
         "actions": [
            "list_accounts",
            "read_balances",
            "read_transactions"
         ],
         "locations": [
            "https://example.com/accounts"
         ]
      },
      {
         "type": "payment_initiation",
         "actions": [
            "initiate",
            "status",
            "cancel"
         ],
         "locations": [
            "https://example.com/payments"
         ],
         "instructedAmount": {
            "currency": "EUR",
            "amount": "123.50"
         },
         "creditorName": "Merchant A",
         "creditorAccount": {
            "iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
         },
         "remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
      }
   ]

    Figure 3: Example of "authorization_details" for a Combined Request

   The JSON objects with type fields of account_information and
   payment_initiation represent the different authorization_details to
   be used by the AS to ask for consent.

      |  Note: The AS will make this data subsequently available to the
      |  respective RSs (see Section 9).

2.1.  Authorization Details Types

   The AS controls the interpretation of the value of the type parameter
   as well as the object fields that the type parameter allows.
   However, the value of the type parameter is also generally documented
   and intended to be used by developers.  It is RECOMMENDED that API
   designers choose type values that are easily copied without
   ambiguity.  For example, some glyphs have multiple Unicode code
   points for the same visual character, and a developer could
   potentially type a different character than what the AS has defined.
   Possible means of reducing potential confusion are limiting the value
   to ASCII [RFC0020] characters, providing a machine-readable listing
   of data type values, or instructing developers to copy and paste
   directly from the documentation.

   If an application or API is expected to be deployed across different
   servers, such as the case in an open standard, the API designer is
   RECOMMENDED to use a collision-resistant namespace under their
   control, such as a URI that the API designer controls.

   The following example shows how an implementation could utilize the
   namespace https://scheme.example.org/ to ensure collision-resistant
   type values.

   {
      "type": "https://scheme.example.org/files",
      "locations": [
         "https://example.com/files"
      ],
      "permissions": [
         {
            "path": "/myfiles/A",
            "access": [
               "read"
            ]
         },
         {
            "path": "/myfiles/A/X",
            "access": [
               "read",
               "write"
            ]
         }
      ]
   }

      Figure 4: Example of "authorization_details" with a URL as Type
                                 Identifier

2.2.  Common Data Fields

   This specification defines a set of common data fields that are
   designed to be usable across different types of APIs.  This
   specification does not require the use of these common fields by an
   API definition but, instead, provides them as reusable generic
   components for API designers to make use of.  The allowable values of
   all fields are determined by the API being protected, as defined by a
   particular "type" value.

   locations:  An array of strings representing the location of the
      resource or RS.  These strings are typically URIs identifying the
      location of the RS.  This field can allow a client to specify a
      particular RS, as discussed in Section 12.

   actions:  An array of strings representing the kinds of actions to be
      taken at the resource.

   datatypes:  An array of strings representing the kinds of data being
      requested from the resource.

   identifier:  A string identifier indicating a specific resource
      available at the API.

   privileges:  An array of strings representing the types or levels of
      privilege being requested at the resource.

   When different common data fields are used in combination, the
   permissions the client requests are the product of all the values.
   The object represents a request for all actions values listed within
   the object to be used at all locations values listed within the
   object for all datatypes values listed within the object.  In the
   following example, the client is requesting read and write access to
   both the contacts and photos belonging to customers in a
   customer_information API.  If this request is granted, the client
   would assume it would be able to use any combination of rights
   defined by the API, such as read access to the photos and write
   access to the contacts.

   [
      {
         "type": "customer_information",
         "locations": [
            "https://example.com/customers"
         ],
         "actions": [
            "read",
            "write"
         ],
         "datatypes": [
            "contacts",
            "photos"
         ]
      }
   ]

    Figure 5: Example of "authorization_details" with Common Data Fields

   If the client wishes to have finer control over its access, it can
   send multiple objects.  In this example, the client is asking for
   read access to the contacts and write access to the photos in the
   same API endpoint.  If this request is granted, the client would not
   be able to write to the contacts.

   [
      {
         "type": "customer_information",
         "locations": [
            "https://example.com/customers"
         ],
         "actions": [
            "read"
         ],
         "datatypes": [
            "contacts"
         ]
      },
      {
         "type": "customer_information",
         "locations": [
            "https://example.com/customers"
         ],
         "actions": [
            "write"
         ],
         "datatypes": [
            "photos"
         ]
      }
   ]

       Figure 6: Example of "authorization_details" with Common Data
                         Fields in Multiple Objects

   An API MAY define its own extensions, subject to the type of the
   respective authorization object.  It is anticipated that API
   designers will use a combination of common data fields defined in
   this specification as well as fields specific to the API itself.  The
   following non-normative example shows the use of both common and API-
   specific fields as part of two different fictitious API type values.
   The first access request includes the actions, locations, and
   datatypes fields specified here as well as the API-specific
   geolocation field, indicating access to photos taken at the given
   coordinates.  The second access request includes the actions and
   identifier fields specified here as well as the API-specific currency
   fields.

   [
      {
         "type":"photo-api",
         "actions":[
            "read",
            "write"
         ],
         "locations":[
            "https://server.example.net/",
            "https://resource.local/other"
         ],
         "datatypes":[
            "metadata",
            "images"
         ],
         "geolocation":[
            {
               "lat":-32.364,
               "lng":153.207
            },
            {
               "lat":-35.364,
               "lng":158.207
            }
         ]
      },
      {
         "type":"financial-transaction",
         "actions":[
            "withdraw"
         ],
         "identifier":"account-14-32-32-3",
         "currency":"USD"
      }
   ]

       Figure 7: Example of "authorization_details" Using Common and
                           Extension Data Fields

   If this request is approved, the resulting access token's access
   rights will be the union of the requested types of access for each of
   the two APIs, just as above.

3.  Authorization Request

   The authorization_details authorization request parameter can be used
   to specify authorization requirements in all places where the scope
   parameter is used for the same purpose, examples include:

   *  authorization requests as specified in [RFC6749]

   *  device authorization requests as specified in [RFC8628]

   *  backchannel authentication requests as defined in [OID-CIBA]

   In case of authorization requests as defined in [RFC6749],
   implementers MAY consider using pushed authorization requests
   [RFC9126] to improve the security, privacy, and reliability of the
   flow.  See Sections 12, 13, and 11.4 for details.

   Parameter encoding is determined by the respective context.  In the
   context of an authorization request according to [RFC6749], the
   parameter is encoded using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded
   format of the serialized JSON as shown in Figure 8, using the example
   from Section 2 (line breaks for display purposes only):

   GET /authorize?response_type=code
      &client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
      &state=af0ifjsldkj
      &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
      &code_challenge_method=S256
      &code_challenge=K2-ltc83acc4h0c9w6ESC_rEMTJ3bwc-uCHaoeK1t8U
      &authorization_details=%5B%7B%22type%22%3A%22account%5Finfo
      rmation%22%2C%22actions%22%3A%5B%22list%5Faccounts%22%2C%22
      read%5Fbalances%22%2C%22read%5Ftransactions%22%5D%2C%22loca
      tions%22%3A%5B%22https%3A%2F%2Fexample%2Ecom%2Faccounts%22%
      5D%7D%2C%7B%22type%22%3A%22payment%5Finitiation%22%2C%22act
      ions%22%3A%5B%22initiate%22%2C%22status%22%2C%22cancel%22%5
      D%2C%22locations%22%3A%5B%22https%3A%2F%2Fexample%2Ecom%2Fp
      ayments%22%5D%2C%22instructedAmount%22%3A%7B%22currency%22%
      3A%22EUR%22%2C%22amount%22%3A%22123%2E50%22%7D%2C%22credito
      rName%22%3A%22Merchant%20A%22%2C%22creditorAccount%22%3A%7B
      %22iban%22%3A%22DE02100100109307118603%22%7D%2C%22remittanc
      eInformationUnstructured%22%3A%22Ref%20Number%20Merchant%22
      %7D%5D HTTP/1.1
   Host: server.example.com

              Figure 8: Example of Authorization Request with
                          "authorization_details"

   Based on the data provided in the authorization_details parameter,
   the AS will ask the user for consent to the requested access
   permissions.

      |  Note: The user may also grant a subset of the requested
      |  authorization details.

   In Figure 9, the client wants to get access to account information
   and initiate a payment:

   [
      {
         "type": "account_information",
         "actions": [
            "list_accounts",
            "read_balances",
            "read_transactions"
         ],
         "locations": [
            "https://example.com/accounts"
         ]
      },
      {
         "type": "payment_initiation",
         "actions": [
            "initiate",
            "status",
            "cancel"
         ],
         "locations": [
            "https://example.com/payments"
         ],
         "instructedAmount": {
            "currency": "EUR",
            "amount": "123.50"
         },
         "creditorName": "Merchant A",
         "creditorAccount": {
            "iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
         },
         "remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
      }
   ]

               Figure 9: URL Decoded "authorization_details"

3.1.  Relationship to the "scope" Parameter

   authorization_details and scope can be used in the same authorization
   request for carrying independent authorization requirements.

   Combined use of authorization_details and scope is supported by this
   specification in part to allow existing OAuth-based applications to
   incrementally migrate towards using authorization_details
   exclusively.  It is RECOMMENDED that a given API use only one form of
   requirement specification.

   The AS MUST process both sets of requirements in combination with
   each other for the given authorization request.  The details of how
   the AS combines these parameters are specific to the APIs being
   protected and outside the scope of this specification.

   When gathering user consent, the AS MUST present the merged set of
   requirements represented by the authorization request.

   If the resource owner grants the client the requested access, the AS
   will issue tokens to the client that are associated with the
   respective authorization_details (and scope values, if applicable).

3.2.  Relationship to the "resource" Parameter

   The resource authorization request parameter, as defined in
   [RFC8707], can be used to further determine the resources where the
   requested scope can be applied.  The resource parameter does not have
   any impact on the way the AS processes the authorization_details
   authorization request parameter.

4.  Authorization Response

   This specification does not define extensions to the authorization
   response.

5.  Authorization Error Response

   The AS MUST refuse to process any unknown authorization details type
   or authorization details not conforming to the respective type
   definition.  The AS MUST abort processing and respond with an error
   invalid_authorization_details to the client if any of the following
   are true of the objects in the authorization_details structure:

   *  contains an unknown authorization details type value,

   *  is an object of known type but containing unknown fields,

   *  contains fields of the wrong type for the authorization details
      type,

   *  contains fields with invalid values for the authorization details
      type, or

   *  is missing required fields for the authorization details type.

6.  Token Request

   The authorization_details token request parameter can be used to
   specify the authorization details that a client wants the AS to
   assign to an access token.  The AS checks whether the underlying
   grant (in case of grant types authorization_code, refresh_token,
   etc.) or the client's policy (in case of grant type
   client_credentials) allows the issuance of an access token with the
   requested authorization details.  Otherwise, the AS refuses the
   request with the error code invalid_authorization_details (similar to
   invalid_scope).

6.1.  Comparing Authorization Details

   Many actions in the OAuth protocol allow the AS and RS to make
   security decisions based on whether the request is asking for "more"
   or "less" than a previous, existing request.  For example, upon
   refreshing a token, the client can ask for a new access token with
   "fewer permissions" than had been previously authorized by the
   resource owner.  The requested access token will convey the reduced
   permissions, but the resource owner's previous authorization is
   unchanged by such requests.  Since the semantics of the fields in the
   authorization_details will be implementation specific to a given API
   or set of APIs, there is no standardized mechanism to compare two
   arbitrary authorization detail requests.  An AS should not rely on
   simple object comparison in most cases, as the intersection of some
   fields within a request could have side effects on the access rights
   granted, depending on how the API has been designed and deployed.
   This is a similar effect to the scope values used with some APIs.

   When comparing a new request to an existing request, an AS can use
   the same processing techniques as used in granting the request in the
   first place to determine if a resource owner needs to authorize the
   request.  The details of this comparison are dependent on the
   definition of the type of authorization request and outside the scope
   of this specification, but common patterns can be applied.

   This shall be illustrated using our running example.  The example
   authorization request in Section 3, if approved by the user, resulted
   in the issuance of an authorization code associated with the
   privileges to:

   *  list accounts,

   *  access the balance of one or more accounts,

   *  access the transactions of one or more accounts, and

   *  initiate, check the status of, and cancel a payment.

   The client could now request the AS to issue an access token assigned
   with the privilege to just access a list of accounts as follows:

   [
      {
         "type": "account_information",
         "actions": [
            "list_accounts"
         ],
         "locations": [
            "https://example.com/accounts"
         ]
      }
   ]

      Figure 10: Example of "authorization_details" Reduced Privileges

   The example API is designed such that each field used by the
   account_information type contains additive rights, with each value
   within the actions and locations arrays specifying a different
   element of access.  To make a comparison in this instance, the AS
   would perform the following steps:

   *  verify that the authorization code issued in the previous step
      contains an authorization details object of type
      account_information,

   *  verify whether the approved list of actions contains
      list_accounts, and

   *  verify whether the locations value includes only previously
      approved locations.

   If all checks succeed, the AS would issue the requested access token
   with the reduced set of access.

   Note that this comparison is relevant to this specific API type
   definition.  A different API type definition could have different
   processing rules.  For example, an actions value could subsume the
   rights associated with another actions value.  For example, if a
   client initially asks for a token with write access, this implies
   both read and write access to this API:

   [
       {
           "type": "example_api",
           "actions": [
               "write"
           ]
       }
   ]

      Figure 11: Example of "authorization_details" Requesting "write"
                              Access to an API

   Later, that same client makes a refresh request for read access:

   [
       {
           "type": "example_api",
           "actions": [
               "read"
           ]
       }
   ]

      Figure 12: Example of "authorization_details" Requesting "read"
                              Access to an API

   The AS would compare the type value and the actions value to
   determine that the read access is already covered by the write access
   previously granted to the client.

   This same API could be designed with a possible value for privileges
   of admin, used in this example to denote that the resulting token is
   allowed to perform any of the functions on the resources.  If that
   client is then granted such admin privileges to the API, the
   authorization_details would be as follows:

   [
       {
           "type": "example_api",
           "privileges": [
               "admin"
           ]
       }
   ]

     Figure 13: Example of "authorization_details" with "admin" Access
                                 to an API

   The AS would compare the type value and find that the privileges
   value subsumes any aspects of read or write access that had been
   granted to the client previously.  Note that other API definitions
   can use privileges such that values do not subsume one another.

   The next example shows how the client can use the common data element
   locations (see Section 2.2) to request the issuance of an access
   token restricted to a certain RS.  In our running example, the client
   may ask for all permissions of the approved grant of type
   payment_initiation applicable to the RS residing at
   https://example.com/payments as follows:

   [
      {
         "type": "payment_initiation",
         "locations": [
            "https://example.com/payments"
         ]
      }
   ]

        Figure 14: Example of "authorization_details" Requesting an
                      Audience-Restricted Access Token

7.  Token Response

   In addition to the token response parameters as defined in [RFC6749],
   the AS MUST also return the authorization_details as granted by the
   resource owner and assigned to the respective access token.

   The authorization details assigned to the access token issued in a
   token response are determined by the authorization_details parameter
   of the corresponding token request.  If the client does not specify
   the authorization_details token request parameters, the AS determines
   the resulting authorization_details at its discretion.

   The AS MAY omit values in the authorization_details to the client.

   For our running example, it would look like this:

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Cache-Control: no-store

   {
      "access_token": "2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
      "token_type": "example",
      "expires_in": 3600,
      "refresh_token": "tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
      "authorization_details": [
         {
            "type": "payment_initiation",
            "actions": [
               "initiate",
               "status",
               "cancel"
            ],
            "locations": [
               "https://example.com/payments"
            ],
            "instructedAmount": {
               "currency": "EUR",
               "amount": "123.50"
            },
            "creditorName": "Merchant A",
            "creditorAccount": {
               "iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
            },
            "remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
         }
      ]
   }

                     Figure 15: Example Token Response

7.1.  Enriched Authorization Details in Token Response

   The authorization details attached to the access token MAY differ
   from what the client requests.  In addition to the user authorizing
   less than what the client requested, there are some use cases where
   the AS enriches the data in an authorization details object.  Whether
   enrichment is allowed and specifics of how it works are necessarily
   part of the definition of the respective authorization details type.

   As one example, a client may ask for access to account information
   but leave the decision about the specific accounts it will be able to
   access to the user.  During the course of the authorization process,
   the user would select the subset of their accounts that they want to
   allow the client to access.  As one design option to convey the
   selected accounts, the AS could add this information to the
   respective authorization details object.

   In that example, the requested authorization_details parameter might
   look like the following.  In this example, the empty arrays serve as
   placeholders for where data will be added during enrichment by the
   AS.  This example is illustrative only and is not intended to suggest
   a preference for designing the specifics of any authorization details
   type this way.

   "authorization_details": [
      {
         "type": "account_information",
         "access": {
            "accounts": [],
            "balances": [],
            "transactions": []
         },
         "recurringIndicator":true
      }
   ]

          Figure 16: Example of Requested "authorization_details"

   The AS then would expand the authorization details object and add the
   respective account identifiers.

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Cache-Control: no-store

   {
      "access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
      "token_type":"example",
      "expires_in":3600,
      "refresh_token":"tGzv3JokF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
      "authorization_details":[
         {
            "type":"account_information",
            "access":{
               "accounts":[
                  {
                     "iban":"DE2310010010123456789"
                  },
                  {
                     "maskedPan":"123456xxxxxx1234"
                  }
               ],
               "balances":[
                  {
                     "iban":"DE2310010010123456789"
                  }
               ],
               "transactions":[
                  {
                     "iban":"DE2310010010123456789"
                  },
                  {
                     "maskedPan":"123456xxxxxx1234"
                  }
               ]
            },
            "recurringIndicator":true
         }
      ]
   }

           Figure 17: Example of Enriched "authorization_details"

   For another example, the client is asking for access to a medical
   record but does not know the record number at request time.  In this
   example, the client specifies the type of access it wants but doesn't
   specify the location or identifier of that access.

   {
   "authorization_details": [
      {
         "type": "medical_record",
         "sens": [ "HIV", "ETH", "MART" ],
         "actions": [ "read" ],
         "datatypes": [ "Patient", "Observation", "Appointment" ]
      }
   ]}

          Figure 18: Example of Requested "authorization_details"

   When the user interacts with the AS, they select which of the medical
   records they are responsible for giving to the client.  This
   information gets returned with the access token.

   {
      "access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
      "token_type":"example",
      "expires_in":3600,
      "refresh_token":"tGzv3JokF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
      "authorization_details":[
       {
         "type": "medical_record",
         "sens": [ "HIV", "ETH", "MART" ],
         "actions": [ "read" ],
         "datatypes": [ "Patient", "Observation", "Appointment" ],
         "identifier": "patient-541235",
         "locations": [ "https://records.example.com/" ]
        }
     ]
   }

           Figure 19: Example of Enriched "authorization_details"

      |  Note: The client needs to be aware upfront of the possibility
      |  that a certain authorization details object can be enriched.
      |  It is assumed that this property is part of the definition of
      |  the respective authorization details type.

8.  Token Error Response

   The Token Error Response MUST conform to the rules given in
   Section 5.

9.  Resource Servers

   In order to enable the RS to enforce the authorization details as
   approved in the authorization process, the AS MUST make this data
   available to the RS.  The AS MAY add the authorization_details field
   to access tokens in JSON Web Token (JWT) format or to token
   introspection responses.

9.1.  JWT-Based Access Tokens

   If the access token is a JWT [RFC7519], the AS is RECOMMENDED to add
   the authorization details object, filtered to the specific audience,
   as a top-level claim.

   The AS will typically also add further claims to the JWT that the RS
   requires request processing, e.g., user ID, roles, and transaction-
   specific data.  What claims the particular RS requires is defined by
   the RS-specific policy with the AS.

   The following shows the contents of an example JWT for the payment
   initiation example above:

   {
      "iss": "https://as.example.com",
      "sub": "24400320",
      "aud": "a7AfcPcsl2",
      "exp": 1311281970,
      "acr": "psd2_sca",
      "txn": "8b4729cc-32e4-4370-8cf0-5796154d1296",
      "authorization_details": [
         {
            "type": "https://scheme.example.com/payment_initiation",
            "actions": [
               "initiate",
               "status",
               "cancel"
            ],
            "locations": [
               "https://example.com/payments"
            ],
            "instructedAmount": {
               "currency": "EUR",
               "amount": "123.50"
            },
            "creditorName": "Merchant A",
            "creditorAccount": {
               "iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
            },
            "remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
         }
      ],
      "debtorAccount": {
         "iban": "DE40100100103307118608",
         "user_role": "owner"
      }
   }

     Figure 20: Example of "authorization_details" in JWT-Based Access
                                   Token

   In this case, the AS added the following example claims to the JWT-
   based access token:

   sub:  indicates the user for which the client is asking for payment
      initiation.

   txn:  transaction id used to trace the transaction across the
      services of provider example.com

   debtorAccount:  API-specific field containing the debtor account.  In
      the example, this account was not passed in the
      authorization_details but was selected by the user during the
      authorization process.  The field user_role conveys the role the
      user has with respect to this particular account.  In this case,
      they are the owner.  This data is used for access control at the
      payment API (the RS).

9.2.  Token Introspection

   Token introspection [RFC7662] provides a means for an RS to query the
   AS to determine information about an access token.  If the AS
   includes authorization detail information for the token in its
   response, the information MUST be conveyed with authorization_details
   as a top-level member of the introspection response JSON object.  The
   authorization_details member MUST contain the same structure defined
   in Section 2, potentially filtered and extended for the RS making the
   introspection request.

   Here is an example introspection response for the payment initiation
   example:

   {
      "active": true,
      "sub": "24400320",
      "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
      "exp": 1311281970,
      "acr": "psd2_sca",
      "txn": "8b4729cc-32e4-4370-8cf0-5796154d1296",
      "authorization_details": [
         {
            "type": "https://scheme.example.com/payment_initiation",
            "actions": [
               "initiate",
               "status",
               "cancel"
            ],
            "locations": [
               "https://example.com/payments"
            ],
            "instructedAmount": {
               "currency": "EUR",
               "amount": "123.50"
            },
            "creditorName": "Merchant123",
            "creditorAccount": {
               "iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
            },
            "remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
         }
      ],
      "debtorAccount": {
         "iban": "DE40100100103307118608",
         "user_role": "owner"
      }
   }

       Figure 21: Example of "authorization_details" in Introspection
                                  Response

10.  Metadata

   To advertise its support for this feature, the supported list of
   authorization details types is included in the AS metadata response
   [RFC8414] using the metadata parameter
   authorization_details_types_supported, which is a JSON array.

   This is illustrated by the following example:

   {
      ...
      "authorization_details_types_supported":[
         "payment_initiation",
         "account_information"
      ]
   }

         Figure 22: Example of Server Metadata about the Supported
                           Authorization Details

   Clients MAY indicate the authorization details types they will use
   when requesting authorization with the client registration metadata
   parameter authorization_details_types, which is a JSON array.

   This is illustrated by the following example:

   {
      ...
      "authorization_details_types":[
         "payment_initiation"
      ]
   }

     Figure 23: Example of Server Metadata about Authorization Details

   The registration of authorization details types with the AS is
   outside the scope of this specification.

11.  Implementation Considerations

11.1.  Using Authorization Details in a Certain Deployment

   Using authorization details in a certain deployment will require the
   following steps:

   *  Define authorization details types.

   *  Publish authorization details types in the OAuth server metadata.

   *  Determine how authorization details are shown to the user in the
      user consent prompt.

   *  If needed, enrich authorization details in the user consent
      process (e.g., add selected accounts or set expirations).

   *  If needed, determine how authorization details are reflected in
      access token content or introspection responses.

   *  Determine how the RSs process the authorization details or token
      data derived from authorization details.

   *  If needed, entitle clients to use certain authorization details
      types.

11.2.  Minimal Implementation Support

   General AS implementations supporting this specification should
   provide the following basic functions:

   *  Support advertisement of supported authorization details types in
      OAuth server metadata

   *  Accept the authorization_details parameter in authorization
      requests in conformance with this specification

   *  Support storage of consented authorization details as part of a
      grant

   *  Implement default behavior for adding authorization details to
      access tokens and token introspection responses in order to make
      them available to RSs (similar to scope values).  This should work
      with any grant type, especially authorization_code and
      refresh_token.

   Processing and presentation of authorization details will vary
   significantly among different authorization details types.
   Implementations should therefore support customization of the
   respective behavior.  In particular, implementations should allow
   deployments to:

   *  determine presentation of the authorization details;

   *  modify requested authorization details in the user consent
      process, e.g., adding fields; and

   *  merge requested and preexisting authorization details.

   One approach to supporting such customization would be to have a
   mechanism allowing the registration of extension modules, each of
   them responsible for rendering the respective user consent and any
   transformation needed to provide the data needed to the RS by way of
   structured access tokens or token introspection responses.

11.3.  Use of Machine-Readable Type Schemas

   Implementations might allow deployments to use machine-readable
   schema languages for defining authorization details types to
   facilitate creating and validating authorization details objects
   against such schemas.  For example, if an authorization details type
   were defined using JSON Schemas [JSON.Schema], the JSON Schema
   identifier could be used as type value in the respective
   authorization details objects.

   Note, however, that type values are identifiers understood by the AS
   and, to the extent necessary, the client and RS.  This specification
   makes no assumption that a type value would point to a machine-
   readable schema format or that any party in the system (such as the
   client, AS, or RS) would dereference or process the contents of the
   type field in any specific way.

11.4.  Large Requests

   Authorization request URIs containing authorization_details in a
   request parameter or a request object can become very long.
   Therefore, implementers should consider using the request_uri
   parameter as defined in [RFC9101] in combination with the pushed
   request object mechanism as defined in [RFC9126] to pass
   authorization_details in a reliable and secure manner.  Here is an
   example of such a pushed authorization request that sends the
   authorization request data directly to the AS via an HTTPS-protected
   connection:

     POST /as/par HTTP/1.1
     Host: as.example.com
     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
     Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3

     response_type=code&
     client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
     &state=af0ifjsldkj
     &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
     &code_challenge_method=S256
     &code_challenge=K2-ltc83acc4h0c9w6ESC_rEMTJ3bwc-uCHaoeK1t8U
     &authorization_details=%5B%7B%22type%22%3A%22account_information%22
     %2C%22actions%22%3A%5B%22list_accounts%22%2C%22read_balances%22%2C%
     22read_transactions%22%5D%2C%22locations%22%3A%5B%22https%3A%2F%2Fe
     xample.com%2Faccounts%22%5D%7D%2C%7B%22type%22%3A%22payment_initiat
     ion%22%2C%22actions%22%3A%5B%22initiate%22%2C%22status%22%2C%22canc
     el%22%5D%2C%22locations%22%3A%5B%22https%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%2Fpaym
     ents%22%5D%2C%22instructedAmount%22%3A%7B%22currency%22%3A%22EUR%22
     %2C%22amount%22%3A%22123.50%22%7D%2C%22creditorName%22%3A%22Merchan
     t123%22%2C%22creditorAccount%22%3A%7B%22iban%22%3A%22DE021001001093
     07118603%22%7D%2C%22remittanceInformationUnstructured%22%3A%22Ref%2
     0Number%20Merchant%22%7D%5D

   Figure 24: Example of Large Request including "authorization_details"

12.  Security Considerations

   The authorization_details parameter is sent through the user agent in
   case of an OAuth authorization request, which makes them vulnerable
   to modifications by the user.  If the integrity of the
   authorization_details is a concern, clients MUST protect
   authorization_details against tampering and swapping.  This can be
   achieved by signing the request using signed request objects as
   defined in [RFC9101] or using the request_uri authorization request
   parameter as defined in [RFC9101] in conjunction with [RFC9126] to
   pass the URI of the request object to the AS.

   All string comparisons in an authorization_details parameter are to
   be done as defined by [RFC8259].  No additional transformation or
   normalization is to be done in evaluating equivalence of string
   values.

   The common data field locations allows a client to specify where it
   intends to use a certain authorization, i.e., it is possible to
   unambiguously assign permissions to RSs.  In situations with multiple
   RSs, this prevents unintended client authorizations (e.g., a read
   scope value potentially applicable for an email as well as a cloud
   service) through audience restriction.

   The AS MUST properly sanitize and handle the data passed in the
   authorization_details in order to prevent injection attacks.

   The Security Considerations of [RFC6749], [RFC7662], and [RFC8414]
   also apply.

13.  Privacy Considerations

   It is especially important for implementers to design and use
   authorization details in a privacy-preserving manner.

   Any sensitive personal data included in authorization_details must be
   prevented from leaking, e.g., through referrer headers.
   Implementation options include encrypted request objects as defined
   in [RFC9101] or transmission of authorization_details via end-to-end
   encrypted connections between client and AS by utilizing [RFC9126]
   and the request_uri authorization request parameter as defined in
   [RFC9101].  The latter does not require application-level encryption,
   but it requires another message exchange between the client and the
   AS.

   Even if the request data is encrypted, an attacker could use the AS
   to learn the user's data by injecting the encrypted request data into
   an authorization request on a device under their control and use the
   AS's user consent screens to show the (decrypted) user data in the
   clear.  Implementations need to consider this attack vector and
   implement appropriate countermeasures, e.g., by only showing portions
   of the data or, if possible, determining whether the assumed user
   context is still the same (after user authentication).

   The AS needs to take into consideration the privacy implications when
   sharing authorization_details with the client or RSs.  The AS should
   share this data with those parties on a "need to know" basis as
   determined by local policy.

14.  IANA Considerations

14.1.  OAuth Parameters Registration

   The following parameter has been registered in the "OAuth Parameters"
   registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC6749].

   Name:  authorization_details

   Parameter Usage Location:  authorization request, token request,
      token response

   Change Controller:  IETF

   Reference:  RFC 9396

14.2.  JSON Web Token Claims Registration

   The following value has been registered in the IANA "JSON Web Token
   Claims" registry established by [RFC7519].

   Claim Name:  authorization_details

   Claim Description:  The claim authorization_details contains a JSON
      array of JSON objects representing the rights of the access token.
      Each JSON object contains the data to specify the authorization
      requirements for a certain type of resource.

   Change Controller:  IETF

   Reference:  Section 9.1 of RFC 9396

14.3.  OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration

   The following value has been registered in the IANA "OAuth Token
   Introspection Response" registry established by [RFC7662].

   Name:  authorization_details

   Description:  The member authorization_details contains a JSON array
      of JSON objects representing the rights of the access token.  Each
      JSON object contains the data to specify the authorization
      requirements for a certain type of resource.

   Change Controller:  IETF

   Reference:  Section 9.2 of RFC 9396

14.4.  OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration

   The following values have been registered in the IANA "OAuth
   Authorization Server Metadata" registry of [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
   established by [RFC8414].

   Metadata Name:  authorization_details_types_supported

   Metadata Description:  JSON array containing the authorization
      details types the AS supports

   Change Controller:  IETF

   Reference:  Section 10 of RFC 9396

14.5.  OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration

   The following value has been registered in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic
   Client Registration Metadata" registry of [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
   established by [RFC7591].

   Client Metadata Name:  authorization_details_types

   Client Metadata Description:  Indicates what authorization details
      types the client uses.

   Change Controller:  IETF

   Reference:  Section 10 of RFC 9396

14.6.  OAuth Extensions Error Registration

   The following value has been registered in the IANA "OAuth Extensions
   Error Registry" of [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC6749].

   Name:  invalid_authorization_details

   Usage Location:  token endpoint, authorization endpoint

   Protocol Extension:  OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests

   Change Controller:  IETF

   Reference:  Section 5 of RFC 9396

15.  References

15.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7662]  Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
              RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8414]  Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
              Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.

   [RFC8628]  Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
              "OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8628>.

   [RFC8707]  Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Resource
              Indicators for OAuth 2.0", RFC 8707, DOI 10.17487/RFC8707,
              February 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8707>.

15.2.  Informative References

   [CSC]      Cloud Signature Consortium, "Architectures and protocols
              for remote signature applications", Version 1.0.4.0, June
              2019, <https://cloudsignatureconsortium.org/wp-
              content/uploads/2020/01/CSC_API_V1_1.0.4.0.pdf>.

   [ETSI]     ETSI, "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI);
              Protocols for remote digital signature creation", V1.1.1,
              ETSI TS 119 432, March 2019,
              <https://www.etsi.org/deliver/
              etsi_ts/119400_119499/119432/01.01.01_60/
              ts_119432v010101p.pdf>.

   [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
              IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.

   [JSON.Schema]
              OpenJS Foundation, "JSON Schema",
              <https://json-schema.org/>.

   [OID-CIBA] Fernandez, G., Walter, F., Nennker, A., Tonge, D., and B.
              Campbell, "OpenID Connect Client-Initiated Backchannel
              Authentication Flow - Core 1.0", 1 September 2021,
              <https://openid.net/specs/openid-client-initiated-
              backchannel-authentication-core-1_0.html>.

   [OIDC]     Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
              C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
              errata set 1", 8 November 2014,
              <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.

   [RFC0020]  Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", STD 80,
              RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

   [RFC7591]  Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
              P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
              RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.

   [RFC8259]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.

   [RFC9101]  Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "The OAuth 2.0
              Authorization Framework: JWT-Secured Authorization Request
              (JAR)", RFC 9101, DOI 10.17487/RFC9101, August 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9101>.

   [RFC9126]  Lodderstedt, T., Campbell, B., Sakimura, N., Tonge, D.,
              and F. Skokan, "OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests",
              RFC 9126, DOI 10.17487/RFC9126, September 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9126>.

   [Transaction-Auth]
              Lodderstedt, T., "Transaction Authorization or why we need
              to re-think OAuth scopes", 20 April 2019,
              <https://medium.com/oauth-2/transaction-authorization-or-
              why-we-need-to-re-think-oauth-scopes-2326e2038948>.

Appendix A.  Additional Examples

A.1.  OpenID Connect

   OpenID Connect [OIDC] specifies the JSON-based claims request
   parameter that can be used to specify the claims a client (acting as
   an OpenID Connect Relying Party) wishes to receive in a fine-grained
   and privacy-preserving way as well as assign those claims to certain
   delivery mechanisms, i.e., ID Token or userinfo response.

   The combination of the scope value openid and the additional
   parameter claims can be used beside authorization_details in the same
   way as every non-OIDC scope value.

   Alternatively, there could be an authorization details type for
   OpenID Connect.  This section gives an example of what such an
   authorization details type could look like, but defining this
   authorization details type is outside the scope of this
   specification.

   These hypothetical examples try to encapsulate all details specific
   to the OpenID Connect part of an authorization process into an
   authorization JSON object.

   The top-level fields are based on the definitions given in [OIDC]:

   claim_sets:  the names of predefined claim sets, replacement for
      respective scope values, such as profile

   max_age:  Maximum Authentication Age

   acr_values:  requested Authentication Context Class Reference (ACR)
      values

   claims:  the claims JSON structure as defined in [OIDC]

   This is a simple request for some claim sets.

   [
      {
         "type": "openid",
         "locations": [
            "https://op.example.com/userinfo"
         ],
         "claim_sets": [
            "email",
            "profile"
         ]
      }
   ]

           Figure 25: Example of OpenID Connect Request Utilizing
                          "authorization_details"

      |  Note: locations specifies the location of the userinfo endpoint
      |  since this is the only place where an access token is used by a
      |  client (Relying Party) in OpenID Connect to obtain claims.

   A more sophisticated example is shown in Figure 26.

   [
      {
         "type": "openid",
         "locations": [
            "https://op.example.com/userinfo"
         ],
         "max_age": 86400,
         "acr_values": "urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver",
         "claims": {
            "userinfo": {
               "given_name": {
                  "essential": true
               },
               "nickname": null,
               "email": {
                  "essential": true
               },
               "email_verified": {
                  "essential": true
               },
               "picture": null,
               "http://example.com/claims/groups": null
            },
            "id_token": {
               "auth_time": {
                  "essential": true
               }
            }
         }
      }
   ]

      Figure 26: Advanced Example of OpenID Connect Request Utilizing
                          "authorization_details"

A.2.  Remote Electronic Signing

   The following example is based on the concept laid out for remote
   electronic signing in ETSI TS 119 432 [ETSI] and the Cloud Signature
   Consortium (CSC) API for remote signature creation [CSC].

   [
      {
         "type": "sign",
         "locations": [
            "https://signing.example.com/signdoc"
         ],
         "credentialID": "60916d31-932e-4820-ba82-1fcead1c9ea3",
         "documentDigests": [
            {
               "hash": "sTOgwOm+474gFj0q0x1iSNspKqbcse4IeiqlDg/HWuI=",
               "label": "Credit Contract"
            },
            {
               "hash": "HZQzZmMAIWekfGH0/ZKW1nsdt0xg3H6bZYztgsMTLw0=",
               "label": "Contract Payment Protection Insurance"
            }
         ],
         "hashAlgorithmOID": "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1"
      }
   ]

                  Figure 27: Example of Electronic Signing

   The top-level fields have the following meaning:

   credentialID:  identifier of the certificate to be used for signing

   documentDigests:  array containing the hash of every document to be
      signed (hash fields).  Additionally, the corresponding label field
      identifies the respective document to the user, e.g., to be used
      in user consent.

   hashAlgorithm:  algorithm that was used to calculate the hash values

   The AS is supposed to ask the user for consent for the creation of
   signatures for the documents listed in the structure.  The client
   uses the access token issued as a result of the process to call the
   document signature API at the respective signing service to actually
   create the signature.  This access token is bound to the client, the
   user ID and the hashes (and signature algorithm) as consented by the
   user.

A.3.  Access to Tax Data

   This example is inspired by an API allowing third parties to access
   citizen's tax declarations and income statements, for example, to
   determine their creditworthiness.

   [
       {
           "type": "tax_data",
           "locations": [
               "https://taxservice.govehub.no.example.com"
           ],
           "actions":"read_tax_declaration",
           "periods": ["2018"],
           "duration_of_access": 30,
           "tax_payer_id": "23674185438934"
       }
   ]

                   Figure 28: Example of Tax Data Access

   The top-level fields have the following meaning:

   periods:  the periods the client wants to access

   duration_of_access:  how long the clients intend to access the data
      in days

   tax_payer_id:  identifier of the taxpayer (if known to the client)

A.4.  eHealth

   These two examples are inspired by requirements for APIs used in the
   Norwegian eHealth system.

   In this use case, the physical therapist sits in front of their
   computer using a local Electronic Health Records (EHR) system.  They
   want to look at the electronic patient records of a certain patient,
   and they also want to fetch the patient's journal entries in another
   system, perhaps at another institution or a national service.  Access
   to this data is provided by an API.

   The information necessary to authorize the request at the API is only
   known by the EHR system and must be presented to the API.

   In the first example, the authorization details object contains the
   identifier of an organization.  In this case, the API needs to know
   if the given organization has the lawful basis for processing
   personal health information to give access to sensitive data.

   "authorization_details": {
       "type": "patient_record",
       "requesting_entity": {
           "type": "Practitioner",
           "identifier": [
           {
               "system": "urn:oid:2.16.578.1.12.4.1.4.4",
               "value": "1234567"
           }],
           "practitioner_role": {
               "organization": {
                   "identifier": {
                       "system": "urn:oid:2.16.578.1.12.4.1.2.101",
                       "type": "ENH",
                       "value": "[organizational number]"
                   }
               }
           }
       }
   }

                         Figure 29: eHealth Example

   In the second example, the API requires more information to authorize
   the request.  In this case, the authorization details object contains
   additional information about the health institution and the current
   profession the user has at the time of the request.  The additional
   level of detail could be used for both authorization and data
   minimization.

   [
      {
         "type": "patient_record",
         "location": "https://fhir.example.com/patient",
         "actions": [
            "read"
         ],
         "patient_identifier": [
            {
               "system": "urn:oid:2.16.578.1.12.4.1.4.1",
               "value": "12345678901"
            }
         ],
         "reason_for_request": "Clinical treatment",
         "requesting_entity": {
            "type": "Practitioner",
            "identifier": [
               {
                  "system": "urn:oid:2.16.578.1.12.4.1.4.4",
                  "value": "1234567"
               }
            ],
            "practitioner_role": {
               "organization": {
                  "identifier": [
                     {
                        "system": "urn:oid:2.16.578.1.12.4.1.2.101",
                        "type": "ENH",
                        "value": "<organizational number>"
                     }
                  ],
                  "type": {
                     "coding": [
                        {
                           "system":
                              "http://hl7.example.org/fhir/org-type",
                           "code": "dept",
                           "display": "Hospital Department"
                        }
                     ]
                  },
                  "name": "Akuttmottak"
               },
               "profession": {
                  "coding": [
                     {
                        "system": "http://snomed.example.org/sct",
                        "code": "36682004",
                        "display": "Physical therapist"
                     }
                  ]
               }
            }
         }
      }
   ]

                    Figure 30: Advanced eHealth Example

   Description of the fields:

   patient_identifier:  the identifier of the patient composed of a
      system identifier in OID format (namespace) and the actual value
      within this namespace.

   reason_for_request:  the reason why the user wants to access a
      certain API.

   requesting_entity:  specification of the requester by means of
      identity, role and organizational context.  This data is provided
      to facilitate authorization and for auditing purposes.

   In this use case, the AS authenticates the requester, who is not the
   patient, and approves access based on policies.

Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank Daniel Fett, Sebastian Ebling, Dave Tonge,
   Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, and Rob Otto for their valuable feedback
   during the preparation of this specification.

   We would also like to thank Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Takahiko Kawasaki,
   Daniel Fett, Dave Tonge, Travis Spencer, Joergen Binningsboe, Aamund
   Bremer, Steinar Noem, Francis Pouatcha, Jacob Ideskog, Hannes
   Tschofenig, and Aaron Parecki for their valuable feedback to this
   specification.

Authors' Addresses

   Torsten Lodderstedt
   yes.com
   Email: torsten@lodderstedt.net


   Justin Richer
   Bespoke Engineering
   Email: ietf@justin.richer.org