Rfc8316
TitleAutonomic Networking Use Case for Distributed Detection of Service Level Agreement (SLA) Violations
AuthorJ. Nobre, L. Granville, A. Clemm, A. Gonzalez Prieto
DateFebruary 2018
Format:TXT, HTML
Status:INFORMATIONAL






Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)                             J. Nobre
Request for Comments: 8316           University of Vale do Rio dos Sinos
Category: Informational                                     L. Granville
ISSN: 2070-1721                  Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
                                                                A. Clemm
                                                                  Huawei
                                                      A. Gonzalez Prieto
                                                                  VMware
                                                           February 2018


       Autonomic Networking Use Case for Distributed Detection of
                Service Level Agreement (SLA) Violations

Abstract

   This document describes an experimental use case that employs
   autonomic networking for the monitoring of Service Level Agreements
   (SLAs).  The use case is for detecting violations of SLAs in a
   distributed fashion.  It strives to optimize and dynamically adapt
   the autonomic deployment of active measurement probes in a way that
   maximizes the likelihood of detecting service-level violations with a
   given resource budget to perform active measurements.  This
   optimization and adaptation should be done without any outside
   guidance or intervention.

   This document is a product of the IRTF Network Management Research
   Group (NMRG).  It is published for informational purposes.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Research Task Force
   (IRTF).  The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related research
   and development activities.  These results might not be suitable for
   deployment.  This RFC represents the consensus of the Network
   Management Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF).
   Documents approved for publication by the IRSG are not candidates for
   any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8316.






RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018


Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Definitions and Acronyms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Current Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Use Case Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  A Distributed Autonomic Solution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Intended User Experience  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.1.  Device-Based Self-Knowledge and Decisions . . . . . . . .  11
     7.2.  Interaction with Other Devices  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Comparison with Current Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  Related IETF Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   12. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16





















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1.  Introduction

   The Internet has been growing dramatically in terms of size,
   capacity, and accessibility in recent years.  Communication
   requirements of distributed services and applications running on top
   of the Internet have become increasingly demanding.  Some examples
   are real-time interactive video or financial trading.  Providing such
   services involves stringent requirements in terms of acceptable
   latency, loss, and jitter.

   Performance requirements lead to the articulation of Service Level
   Objectives (SLOs) that must be met.  Those SLOs are part of Service
   Level Agreements (SLAs) that define a contract between the provider
   and the consumer of a service.  SLOs, in effect, constitute a
   service-level guarantee that the consumer of the service can expect
   to receive (and often has to pay for).  Likewise, the provider of a
   service needs to ensure that the service-level guarantee and
   associated SLOs are met.  Some examples of clauses that relate to
   SLOs can be found in [RFC7297].

   Violations of SLOs can be associated with significant financial loss,
   which can by divided into two categories.  First, there is the loss
   that can be incurred by the user of a service when the agreed service
   levels are not provided.  For example, a financial brokerage's stock
   orders might suffer losses when it is unable to execute stock
   transactions in a timely manner.  An electronic retailer may lose
   customers when its online presence is perceived by customers as
   sluggish.  An online gaming provider may not be able to provide fair
   access to online players, resulting in frustrated players who are
   lost as customers.  In each case, the failure of a service provider
   to meet promised service-level guarantees can have a substantial
   financial impact on users of the service.  Second, there is the loss
   that is incurred by the provider of a service who is unable to meet
   promised SLOs.  Those losses can take several forms, such as
   penalties for violating the service level agreement and even loss of
   future revenue due to reduced customer satisfaction (which, in many
   cases, is more serious).  Hence, SLOs are a key concern for the
   service provider.  In order to ensure that SLOs are not being
   violated, service levels need to be continuously monitored at the
   network infrastructure layer in order to know, for example, when
   mitigating actions need to be taken.  To that end, service-level
   measurements must take place.

   Network measurements can be performed using active or passive
   measurement techniques.  In passive measurements, production traffic
   is observed, and no monitoring traffic is created by the measurement
   process itself.  That is, network conditions are checked in a
   non-intrusive way.  In the context of IP Flow Information Export



RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018


   (IPFIX), several documents were produced that define how to export
   data associated with flow records, i.e., data that is collected as
   part of passive measurement mechanisms, generally applied against
   flows of production traffic (e.g., [RFC7011]).  In addition, it is
   possible to collect real data traffic (not just summarized flow
   records) with time-stamped packets, possibly sampled (e.g., per
   [RFC5474]), as a means of measuring and inferring service levels.
   Active measurements, on the other hand, are more intrusive to the
   network in the sense that they involve injecting synthetic test
   traffic into the network to measure network service levels, as
   opposed to simply observing production traffic.  The IP Performance
   Metrics (IPPM) Working Group produced documents that describe active
   measurement mechanisms such as the One-Way Active Measurement
   Protocol (OWAMP) [RFC4656], the Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol
   (TWAMP) [RFC5357], and the Cisco Service-Level Assurance Protocol
   [RFC6812].  In addition, there are some mechanisms that do not
   cleanly fit into either active or passive categories, such as
   Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) Destination Option
   techniques [RFC8250].

   Active measurement mechanisms offer a high level of control over what
   and how to measure.  They do not require inspecting production
   traffic.  Because of this, active measurements usually offer better
   accuracy and privacy than passive measurement mechanisms.  Traffic
   encryption and regulations that limit the amount of payload
   inspection that can occur are non-issues.  Furthermore, active
   measurement mechanisms are able to detect end-to-end network
   performance problems in a fine-grained way (e.g., simulating the
   traffic that must be handled considering specific SLOs).  As a
   result, active measurements are often preferred over passive
   measurement for SLA monitoring.  Measurement probes must be hosted in
   network devices and measurement sessions must be activated to compute
   the current network metrics (for example, metrics such as the ones
   described in [RFC4148], although note that [RFC4148] was obsoleted by
   [RFC6248]).  This activation should be dynamic in order to follow
   changes in network conditions, such as those related to routes being
   added or new customer demands.

   While offering many advantages, active measurements are expensive in
   terms of network resource consumption.  Active measurements generally
   involve measurement probes that generate synthetic test traffic that
   is directed at a responder.  The responder needs to timestamp test
   traffic it receives and reflect it back to the originating
   measurement probe.  The measurement probe subsequently processes the
   returned packets along with time-stamping information in order to
   compute service levels.  Accordingly, active measurements consume
   substantial CPU cycles as well as memory of network devices to




RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018


   generate and process test traffic.  In addition, synthetic traffic
   increases network load.  Thus, active measurements compete for
   resources with other functions, including routing and switching.

   The resources required and traffic generated by the active
   measurement sessions are, in a large part, a function of the number
   of measured network destinations.  (In addition, the amount of
   traffic generated for each measurement plays a role that, in turn,
   influences the accuracy of the measurement.)  When more destinations
   are measured, a greater number of resources are consumed and more
   traffic is needed to perform the measurements.  Thus, to have better
   monitoring coverage, it is necessary to deploy more sessions, which
   consequently increases consumed resources.  Otherwise, enabling the
   observation of just a small subset of all network flows can lead to
   insufficient coverage.

   Furthermore, while some end-to-end service levels can be determined
   by adding up the service levels observed across different path
   segments, the same is not true for all service levels.  For example,
   the end-to-end delay or packet loss from a node A to a node C routed
   via a node B can often be computed simply by adding delays (or loss)
   from A to B and from B to C.  This allows the decomposition of a
   large set of end-to-end measurements into a much smaller set of
   segment measurements.  However, end-to-end jitter and mean opinion
   scores cannot be decomposed as easily and, for higher accuracy, must
   be measured end-to-end.

   Hence, the decision about how to place measurement probes becomes an
   important management activity.  The goal is to obtain the maximum
   benefits of service-level monitoring with a limited amount of
   measurement overhead.  Specifically, the goal is to maximize the
   number of service-level violations that are detected with a limited
   number of resources.

   The use case and the solution approach described in this document
   address an important practical issue.  They are intended to provide a
   basis for further experimentation to lead to solutions for wider
   deployment.  This document represents the consensus of the IRTF's
   Network Management Research Group (NMRG).  It was discussed
   extensively and received three separate in-depth reviews.

2.  Definitions and Acronyms

   Active Measurements: Techniques to measure service levels that
      involve generating and observing synthetic test traffic

   Passive Measurements: Techniques used to measure service levels based
      on observation of production traffic



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   Autonomic Network: A network containing exclusively autonomic nodes,
      requiring no configuration, and deriving all required information
      through self-knowledge, discovery, or intent.

   Autonomic Service Agent (ASA): An agent implemented on an autonomic
      node that implements an autonomic function, either in part (in the
      case of a distributed function, as in the context of this
      document) or whole

   Measurement Session: A communications association between a probe and
      a responder used to send and reflect synthetic test traffic for
      active measurements

   Probe: The source of synthetic test traffic in an active measurement

   Responder: The destination for synthetic test traffic in an active
      measurement

   SLA: Service Level Agreement

   SLO: Service Level Objective

   P2P: Peer-to-Peer

   (Note: The definitions for "Autonomic Network" and "Autonomic Service
   Agent" are borrowed from [RFC7575]).

3.  Current Approaches

   For feasible deployments of active measurement solutions to
   distribute the available measurement sessions along the network, the
   current best practice consists of relying entirely on the human
   administrator's expertise to infer the best location to activate such
   sessions.  This is done through several steps.  First, it is
   necessary to collect traffic information in order to grasp the
   traffic matrix.  Then, the administrator uses this information to
   infer the best destinations for measurement sessions.  After that,
   the administrator activates sessions on the chosen subset of
   destinations, taking the available resources into account.  This
   practice, however, does not scale well because it is still labor
   intensive and error-prone for the administrator to determine which
   sessions should be activated given the set of critical flows that
   needs to be measured.  Even worse, this practice completely fails in
   networks where the most critical flows change rapidly, resulting in
   dynamic changes to what would be the most important destinations.
   For example, this can be the case in modern cloud environments.  This
   is because fast reactions are necessary to reconfigure the sessions,
   and administrators are just not quick enough in computing and



RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018


   activating the new set of required sessions every time the network
   traffic pattern changes.  Finally, the current practice for active
   measurements usually covers only a fraction of the network flows that
   should be observed, which invariably leads to the damaging
   consequence of undetected SLA violations.

4.  Use Case Description

   The use case involves a service-level provider that needs to monitor
   the network to detect service-level violations using active service-
   level measurements and wants to be able to do so with minimal human
   intervention.  The goal is to conduct the measurements in an
   effective manner to maximize the percentage of detected service-level
   violations.  The service-level provider has a bounded resource budget
   with regard to measurements that can be performed, specifically the
   number of measurements that can be conducted concurrently from any
   one network device and possibly the total amount of measurement
   traffic on the network.  However, while at any one point in time the
   number of measurements conducted is limited, it is possible for a
   device to change which destinations to measure over time.  This can
   be exploited to achieve a balance of eventually covering all possible
   destinations using a reasonable amount of "sampling" where
   measurement coverage of a destination cannot be continuous.  The
   solution needs to be dynamic and able to cope with network conditions
   that may change over time.  The solution should also be embeddable
   inside network devices that control the deployment of active
   measurement mechanisms.

   The goal is to conduct the measurements in a smart manner that
   ensures that the network is broadly covered and that the likelihood
   of detecting service-level violations is maximized.  In order to
   maximize that likelihood, it is reasonable to focus measurement
   resources on destinations that are more likely to incur a violation,
   while spending fewer resources on destinations that are more likely
   to be in compliance.  In order to do this, there are various aspects
   that can be exploited, including past measurements (destinations
   close to a service-level threshold requiring more focus than
   destinations farther from it), complementation with passive
   measurements such as flow data (to identify network destinations that
   are currently popular and critical), and observations from other
   parts of the network.  In addition, measurements can be coordinated
   among different network devices to avoid hitting the same destination
   at the same time and to share results that may be useful in future
   probe placement.

   Clearly, static solutions will have severe limitations.  At the same
   time, human administrators cannot be in the loop for continuous
   dynamic reconfigurations of measurement probes.  Thus, an automated



RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018


   solution, or ideally an autonomic solution, is needed so that network
   measurements are automatically orchestrated and dynamically
   reconfigured from within the network.  This can be accomplished using
   an autonomic solution that is distributed, using ASAs that are
   implemented on nodes in the network.

5.  A Distributed Autonomic Solution

   The use of Autonomic Networking (AN) [RFC7575] can help such
   detection through an efficient activation of measurement sessions.
   Such an approach, along with a detailed assessment confirming its
   viability, is described in [P2PBNM-Nobre-2012].  The problem to be
   solved by AN in the present use case is how to steer the process of
   measurement session activation by a complete solution that sets all
   necessary parameters for this activation to operate efficiently,
   reliably, and securely, with no required human intervention other
   than setting overall policy.

   When a node first comes online, it has no information about which
   measurements are more critical than others.  In the absence of
   information about past measurements and information from measurement
   peers, it may start with an initial set of measurement sessions,
   possibly randomly seeding a set of starter measurements and perhaps
   taking a round-robin approach for subsequent measurement rounds.
   However, as measurements are collected, a node will gain an
   increasing amount of information that it can utilize to refine its
   strategy of selecting measurement targets going forward.  For one, it
   may take note of which targets returned measurement results very
   close to service-level thresholds; these targets may require closer
   scrutiny compared to others.  Second, it may utilize observations
   that are made by its measurement peers in order to conclude which
   measurement targets may be more critical than others and to ensure
   that proper overall measurement coverage is obtained (so that not
   every node incidentally measures the same targets, while other
   targets are not measured at all).

   We advocate for embedding P2P technology in network devices in order
   to use autonomic control loops to make decisions about measurement
   sessions.

   Specifically, we advocate for network devices to implement an
   autonomic function that monitors service levels for violations of
   SLOs and that determines which measurement sessions to set up at any
   given point in time based on current and past observations of the
   node and of other peer nodes.

   By performing these functions locally and autonomically on the device
   itself, which measurements to conduct can be modified quickly based



RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018


   on local observations while taking local resource availability into
   account.  This allows a solution to be more robust and react more
   dynamically to rapidly changing service levels than a solution that
   has to rely on central coordination.  However, in order to optimize
   decisions about which measurements to conduct, a node will need to
   communicate with other nodes.  This allows a node to take into
   account other nodes' observations in addition to its own in its
   decisions.

   For example, remote destinations whose observed service levels are on
   the verge of violating stated objectives may require closer
   monitoring than remote destinations that are comfortably within a
   range of tolerance.  A distributed autonomic solution also allows
   nodes to coordinate their probing decisions to collectively achieve
   the best possible measurement coverage.  Because the number of
   resources available for monitoring, exchanging measurement data, and
   coordinating with other nodes is limited, a node may be interested in
   identifying other nodes whose observations are similar to and
   correlated with its own.  This helps a node prioritize and decide
   which other nodes to coordinate and exchange data with.  All of this
   requires the use of a P2P overlay.

   A P2P overlay is essential for several reasons:

   o  It makes it possible for nodes (or more specifically, the ASAs
      that are deployed on those nodes) in the network to autonomically
      set up measurement sessions without having to rely on a central
      management system or controller to perform configuration
      operations associated with configuring measurement probes and
      responders.

   o  It facilitates the exchange of data between different nodes to
      share measurement results so that each node can refine its
      measurement strategy based not just on its own observations, but
      also on observations from its peers.

   o  It allows nodes to coordinate their measurements to obtain the
      best possible test coverage and avoid measurements that have a
      very low likelihood of detecting service-level violations.

   The provisioning of the P2P overlay should be transparent for the
   network administrator.  An Autonomic Control Plane such as defined in
   [ACP] provides an ideal candidate for the P2P overlay to run on.

   An autonomic solution for the distributed detection of SLA violations
   provides several benefits.  First, it provides efficiency; this
   solution should optimize the resource consumption and avoid resource
   starvation on the network devices.  A device that is "self-aware" of



RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018


   its available resources will be able to adjust measurement activities
   rapidly as needed, without requiring a separate control loop
   involving resource monitoring by an external system.  Second, placing
   logic about where to conduct measurements into the node enables rapid
   control loops that allow devices to react instantly to observations
   and adjust their measurement strategy.  For example, a device could
   decide to adjust the amount of synthetic test traffic being sent
   during the measurement itself depending on results observed so far on
   this and other concurrent measurement sessions.  As a result, the
   solution could decrease the time necessary to detect SLA violations.
   Adaptivity features of an autonomic loop could capture the network
   dynamics faster than a human administrator or even a central
   controller.  Finally, the solution could help to reduce the workload
   of human administrators.

   In practice, these factors combine to maximize the likelihood of SLA
   violations being detected while operating within a given resource
   budget, allowing a continuous measurement strategy that takes into
   account past measurement results to be conducted, observations of
   other measures such as link utilization or flow data, measurement
   results shared between network devices, and future measurement
   activities coordinated among nodes.  Combined, this can result in
   efficient measurement decisions that achieve a golden balance between
   offering broad network coverage and honing in on service-level "hot
   spots".

6.  Intended User Experience

   The autonomic solution should not require any human intervention in
   the distributed detection of SLA violations.  By virtue of the
   solution being autonomic, human users will not have to plan which
   measurements to conduct in a network, which is often a very labor-
   intensive task that requires detailed analysis of traffic matrices
   and network topologies and is not prone to easy dynamic adjustment.
   Likewise, they will not have to configure measurement probes and
   responders.

   There are some ways in which a human administrator may still interact
   with the solution.  First, the human administrator will, of course,
   be notified and obtain reports about service-level violations that
   are observed.  Second, a human administrator may set policies
   regarding how closely to monitor the network for service-level
   violations and how many resources to spend.  For example, an
   administrator may set a resource budget that is assigned to network
   devices for measurement operations.  With that given budget, the
   number of SLO violations that are detected will be maximized.
   Alternatively, an administrator may set a target for the percentage
   of SLO violations that must be detected, i.e., a target for the ratio



RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018


   between the number of detected SLO violations and the number of total
   SLO violations that are actually occurring (some of which might go
   undetected).  In that case, the solution will aim to minimize the
   resources spent (i.e., the amount of test traffic and number of
   measurement sessions) that are required to achieve that target.

7.  Implementation Considerations

   The active measurement model assumes that a typical infrastructure
   will have multiple network segments, multiple Autonomous Systems
   (ASes), and a reasonably large number of routers.  It also considers
   that multiple SLOs can be in place at a given time.  Since
   interoperability in a heterogeneous network is a goal, features found
   on different active measurement mechanisms (e.g., OWAMP, TWAMP, and
   Cisco Service Level Assurance Protocol) and device programmability
   interfaces (such as Juniper's Junos API or Cisco's Embedded Event
   Manager) could be used for the implementation.  The autonomic
   solution should include and/or reference specific algorithms,
   protocols, metrics, and technologies for the implementation of
   distributed detection of SLA violations as a whole.

   Finally, it should be noted that there are multiple deployment
   scenarios, including deployment scenarios that involve physical
   devices hosting autonomic functions or virtualized infrastructure
   hosting the same.  Co-deployment in conjunction with Virtual Network
   Functions (VNFs) is a possibility for further study.

7.1.  Device-Based Self-Knowledge and Decisions

   Each device has self-knowledge about the local SLA monitoring.  This
   could be in the form of historical measurement data and SLOs.
   Besides that, the devices would have algorithms that could decide
   which probes should be activated at a given time.  The choice of
   which algorithm is better for a specific situation would be also
   autonomic.

7.2.  Interaction with Other Devices

   Network devices should share information about service-level
   measurement results.  This information can speed up the detection of
   SLA violations and increase the number of detected SLA violations.
   For example, if one device detects that a remote destination is in
   danger of violating an SLO, other devices may conduct additional
   measurements to the same destination or other destinations in its
   proximity.  For any given network device, the exchange of data may be
   more important with some devices (for example, devices in the same
   network neighborhood or devices that are "correlated" by some other
   means) than with others.  Defining the network devices that exchange



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   measurement data (i.e., management peers) creates a new topology.
   Different approaches could be used to define this topology (e.g.,
   correlated peers [P2PBNM-Nobre-2012]).  To bootstrap peer selection,
   each device should use its known neighbors (e.g., FIB and RIB tables)
   as initial seeds to identify possible peers.  It should be noted that
   a solution will benefit if topology information and network discovery
   functions are provided by the underlying autonomic framework.  A
   solution will need to be able to discover measurement peers as well
   as measurement targets, specifically measurement targets that support
   active measurement responders and that will be able to respond to
   measurement requests and reflect measurement traffic as needed.

8.  Comparison with Current Solutions

   There is no standardized solution for distributed autonomic detection
   of SLA violations.  Current solutions are restricted to ad hoc
   scripts running on a per-node fashion to automate some administrator
   actions.  There are some proposals for passive probe activation
   (e.g., DECON [DECON] and CSAMP [CSAMP]), but these do not focus on
   autonomic features.

9.  Related IETF Work

   This section discusses related IETF work and is provided for
   reference.  This section is not exhaustive; rather, it provides an
   overview of the various initiatives and how they relate to autonomic
   distributed detection of SLA violations.

   1.  LMAP: The Large-Scale Measurement of Broadband Performance
       Working Group standardizes the LMAP measurement system for
       performance management of broadband access devices.  The
       autonomic solution could be relevant to LMAP because it deploys
       measurement probes and could be used for screening for SLA
       violations.  Besides that, a solution to decrease the workload of
       human administrators in service providers is probably highly
       desirable.

   2.  IPFIX: IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Working Group (now
       concluded) aimed to standardize IP flows (i.e., netflows).  IPFIX
       uses measurement probes (i.e., metering exporters) to gather flow
       data.  In this context, the autonomic solution for the activation
       of active measurement probes could possibly be extended to also
       address passive measurement probes.  Besides that, flow
       information could be used in making decisions regarding probe
       activation.






RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018


   3.  ALTO: The Application-Layer Traffic Optimization Working Group
       aims to provide topological information at a higher abstraction
       layer, which can be based upon network policy, and with
       application-relevant service functions located in it.  Their work
       could be leveraged to define the topology for network devices
       that exchange measurement data.

10.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

11.  Security Considerations

   The security of this solution hinges on the security of the network
   underlay, i.e., the Autonomic Control Plane.  If the Autonomic
   Control Plane were to be compromised, an attacker could undermine the
   effectiveness of measurement coordination by reporting fraudulent
   measurement results to peers.  This would cause measurement probes to
   be deployed in an ineffective manner that would increase the
   likelihood that violations of SLOs go undetected.

   Likewise, the security of the solution hinges on the security of the
   deployment mechanism for autonomic functions (in this case, the
   autonomic function that conducts the service-level measurements).  If
   an attacker were able to hijack an autonomic function, it could try
   to exhaust or exceed the resources that should be spent on autonomic
   measurements in order to deplete network resources, including network
   bandwidth due to higher-than-necessary volumes of synthetic test
   traffic generated by measurement probes.  Again, it could also lead
   to reporting of misleading results; among other things, this could
   result in non-optimal selection of measurement targets and, in turn,
   an increase in the likelihood that service-level violations go
   undetected.

12.  Informative References

   [ACP]      Eckert, T., Ed., Behringer, M., Ed., and S. Bjarnason, "An
              Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)", Work in Progress,
              draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-13, December
              2017.

   [CSAMP]    Sekar, V., Reiter, M., Willinger, W., Zhang, H., Kompella,
              R., and D. Andersen, "CSAMP: A System for Network-Wide
              Flow Monitoring", NSDI USENIX Symposium Networked Systems
              Design and Implementation, April 2008.






RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018


   [DECON]    di Pietro, A., Huici, F., Costantini, D., and S.
              Niccolini, "DECON: Decentralized Coordination for Large-
              Scale Flow Monitoring", IEEE INFOCOM Workshops,
              DOI 10.1109/INFCOMW.2010.5466642, March 2010.

   [P2PBNM-Nobre-2012]
              Nobre, J., Granville, L., Clemm, A., and A. Gonzalez
              Prieto, "Decentralized Detection of SLA Violations Using
              P2P Technology, 8th International Conference Network and
              Service Management (CNSM)", 8th International Conference
              on Network and Service Management (CNSM), 2012,
              <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/
              abs_all.jsp?arnumber=6379997>.

   [RFC4148]  Stephan, E., "IP Performance Metrics (IPPM) Metrics
              Registry", BCP 108, RFC 4148, DOI 10.17487/RFC4148, August
              2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4148>.

   [RFC4656]  Shalunov, S., Teitelbaum, B., Karp, A., Boote, J., and M.
              Zekauskas, "A One-way Active Measurement Protocol
              (OWAMP)", RFC 4656, DOI 10.17487/RFC4656, September 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4656>.

   [RFC5357]  Hedayat, K., Krzanowski, R., Morton, A., Yum, K., and J.
              Babiarz, "A Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP)",
              RFC 5357, DOI 10.17487/RFC5357, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5357>.

   [RFC5474]  Duffield, N., Ed., Chiou, D., Claise, B., Greenberg, A.,
              Grossglauser, M., and J. Rexford, "A Framework for Packet
              Selection and Reporting", RFC 5474, DOI 10.17487/RFC5474,
              March 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5474>.

   [RFC6248]  Morton, A., "RFC 4148 and the IP Performance Metrics
              (IPPM) Registry of Metrics Are Obsolete", RFC 6248,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6248, April 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6248>.

   [RFC6812]  Chiba, M., Clemm, A., Medley, S., Salowey, J., Thombare,
              S., and E. Yedavalli, "Cisco Service-Level Assurance
              Protocol", RFC 6812, DOI 10.17487/RFC6812, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6812>.

   [RFC7011]  Claise, B., Ed., Trammell, B., Ed., and P. Aitken,
              "Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)
              Protocol for the Exchange of Flow Information", STD 77,
              RFC 7011, DOI 10.17487/RFC7011, September 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7011>.



RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018


   [RFC7297]  Boucadair, M., Jacquenet, C., and N. Wang, "IP
              Connectivity Provisioning Profile (CPP)", RFC 7297,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7297, July 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7297>.

   [RFC7575]  Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A.,
              Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic
              Networking: Definitions and Design Goals", RFC 7575,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7575, June 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7575>.

   [RFC8250]  Elkins, N., Hamilton, R., and M. Ackermann, "IPv6
              Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) Destination
              Option", RFC 8250, DOI 10.17487/RFC8250, September 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8250>.




































RFC 8316         AN Use Case Detection of SLA Violations   February 2018


Acknowledgements

   We wish to acknowledge the helpful contributions, comments, and
   suggestions that were received from Mohamed Boucadair, Brian
   Carpenter, Hanlin Fang, Bruno Klauser, Diego Lopez, Vincent Roca, and
   Eric Voit.  In addition, we thank Diego Lopez, Vincent Roca, and
   Brian Carpenter for their detailed reviews.

Authors' Addresses

   Jeferson Campos Nobre
   University of Vale do Rio dos Sinos
   Porto Alegre
   Brazil

   Email: jcnobre@unisinos.br


   Lisandro Zambenedetti Granvile
   Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
   Porto Alegre
   Brazil

   Email: granville@inf.ufrgs.br


   Alexander Clemm
   Huawei USA - Futurewei Technologies Inc.
   Santa Clara, California
   United States of America

   Email: ludwig@clemm.org, alexander.clemm@huawei.com


   Alberto Gonzalez Prieto
   VMware
   Palo Alto, California
   United States of America

   Email: agonzalezpri@vmware.com